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SHIFTING BURDENS: DISCRIMINATION
LAW THROUGH THE LENS OF JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
Catherine T. Struve*
Abstract: This Term, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework inapplicable to Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims. This
Article finds the Gross Court’s rationales for repudiating Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins unpersuasive. Although the crux of the Court’s argument is that
it is too confusing to instruct a jury on the burden-shifting framework, in
actuality, there is no evidence that burden-shifting instructions are unduly
confusing. In fact, Gross will exacerbate a different sort of confusion: that
which arises when a jury must resolve two claims under different burden
frameworks. At best, then, the Gross Court’s concerns over judicial administration are a wash. They fail to justify the Court’s departure from the
20-year-old Price Waterhouse precedent. The Article therefore considers the
possibility that the Court’s decision in Gross was driven by policy views
about the nature and merit of ADEA claims, or of employment discrimination claims more generally. By shifting the balance in ADEA and perhaps other employment discrimination cases without articulating a persuasive reason for doing so, the Court may have laid the groundwork for
Congress to revisit the question—thus opening the way for a more explicitly policy-based overhaul of the burden frameworks.

Introduction
Under the framework set by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, an employment discrimination plaintiff bears the burden of proving that discrimination was the determinative factor in the challenged
* © 2010, Catherine T. Struve, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Although I serve as a reporter for a committee that has drafted model jury instructions for
use in civil cases in the Third Circuit, this Article reflects only my own views and not those
of the committee. I thank Stephen Burbank, Kevin Clermont, and Stephen Subrin for
comments on drafts, and participants in a University of Pennsylvania ad hoc workshop for
suggestions on the project. I am grateful to Melinda Harris for excellent research assistance and to the librarians in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress for their
assistance with my research in the papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun.
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employment decision.1 But under an alternative framework that burden can shift: in 1989 a fractured Supreme Court held that upon a
showing that the plaintiff’s protected status (such as sex) played a motivating (or substantial) part in the employer’s adverse action, the burden would shift to the employer to prove that it would have made the
same decision even if the plaintiff had not had that protected status
(e.g., even if the plaintiff had not been a woman).2 Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins—the case in which the Court adopted this test—was seen as a
double edged sword: on one hand, plaintiffs’ advocates liked the idea
of shifting the burden to the defendant to prove the same-decision defense, but on the other, they criticized the decision for immunizing
some employment decisions in which discrimination was found to have
played a role.
Price Waterhouse came to be grouped with a number of other Supreme Court decisions—all viewed as too defendant-friendly—to which
Congress responded in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“the 1991 Act”).3
The 1991 Act adopted the Price Waterhouse framework but modified it by
making the same-decision defense relevant to remedies rather than to
liability. 4 Congress added a provision, now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m), stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.” 5 Congress also
amended Title VII’s enforcement framework by adding a provision,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), that sets a limit on reme1 See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
2 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion). In the
interests of brevity, the description at this point in the text glosses over divisions among the
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins plurality and the concurrences of Justices O’Connor and White.
For the term “motivating part,” see id. at 244, 258. For the term “substantial factor,” see id.
at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). For a discussion of the justices’ internal debates over these terms, see infra
notes 121–139 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Justice O’Connor’s reference to
“direct evidence,” see infra notes 143–149.
3 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 29, 42 U.S.C.). The 1991 Act listed as one of its purposes “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil
rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” Id.
§ 3 (set forth as a note following 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).
4 See id. § 107(a), § 703(m).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
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dies.6 Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) states that “[o]n a claim in which an
individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and
a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the
court may grant declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs attributable to the § 2000e-2(m) claim, but “shall
not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph
(A).”7 In sum, a motivating-factor showing under § 2000e-2(m) establishes liability, while a same-decision showing by the defendant under
Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the plaintiff’s remedies.8
Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act left questions in their wake.
Should either the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting or the statutory burden-shifting framework apply outside the context of Title VII discrimination claims? Although a number of courts concluded that Price Waterhouse did apply to other discrimination (and retaliation) claims, courts
generally viewed §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) as more restricted in their reach.9 And assuming that either the statutory or the
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting scheme was available for a particular
type of claim, what sort of showing was necessary to qualify a case for a
burden-shifting instruction? Relying on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment in Price Waterhouse, some courts restricted mixedmotive burden-shifting to cases featuring “direct evidence” of a discriminatory motive.10 This distinction was heavily criticized, however,
and in the 2003 Desert Palace v. Costa decision the Supreme Court held
that under §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) the “motivating factor” showing could be made by either direct or circumstantial evidence.11
Because the Desert Palace holding addressed only the statutory
mixed-motive framework, it left unclear whether the same approach
should apply under the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive framework that
courts applied to claims other than Title VII discrimination claims.
Onlookers expected the Court to tackle this issue when it granted the
6 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
7 Id.
8 See id. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
9 See McNutt v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 1998) (“By 1991,
our circuit and courts across the country had begun to adopt the Price Waterhouse approach
in all mixed-motive discrimination cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 rolled back the Price
Waterhouse holding in certain types of discrimination claims.” (citation omitted)).
10 See infra notes 155–158 and accompanying text.
11 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003).
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petition for certiorari in Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., an Age Discrimination in Employment (“ADEA”) case that presented the question, “Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII discrimination case?”12 Instead, a narrow majority of the justices opted to moot
the question by holding that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting is unavailable for ADEA claims.13
Part I of this Article argues that the rationales adduced in Gross are
problematic.14 One of those rationales is implausible, and the others all
depend, for their persuasiveness, on the Gross Court’s effort to discredit
Price Waterhouse. But the only reason explicitly cited in Gross for departing from Price Waterhouse is that burden-shifting jury instructions are too
difficult to administer.15 On its face, Gross seems to argue that burdenshifting instructions are inherently confusing; but the Court fails to
support that assertion. The Court could have raised two other arguments concerning confusion, each of which is more serious.16 First,
confusion over the applicability of the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
instruction has been rampant.17 Gross resolved this confusion for ADEA
claims by holding that burden-shifting is never available.18 This decision was an effective choice for eliminating this type of confusion, but it
was not the only possible choice. Second, confusion will continue to
arise for juries faced with the task of adjudicating multiple claims to
which different burden frameworks apply. Gross if anything exacerbates
this confusion.
In sum, Part I argues that the confusion arguments are at best a
wash—which makes them a dubious basis for the Gross Court’s decision
to reject the 20-year-old Price Waterhouse precedent.19 Part II, searching
for some better explanation, considers the possibility that the decision
to reject burden-shifting in Gross reflects underlying views concerning
policy and practice in age discrimination litigation, or in discrimination
12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343
(2009) (No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4462099.
13 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351.
14 See infra notes 23–301 and accompanying text.
15 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
16 See Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 Penn. St. L. Rev. 857, 884 (2010) (noting that
“[t]here is nothing . . . difficult” about the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework,
and that “[w]hat has been difficult about the burden-shifting framework has been figuring
out when to apply it”).
17 That is to say, there is confusion over what factual circumstances will trigger a burden shift in those types of cases that permit burden shifting.
18 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
19 See infra notes 23–301 and accompanying text.
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litigation more generally.20 If such views did drive the decision, they
operated under the surface of the opinion. For that reason, and because the Court did not provide the opportunity for full briefing on
these issues, the decision in Gross fails to account for relevant policy
considerations.
Part II concludes by considering the way forward in the aftermath
of Gross.21 It appears unlikely that the Court will soon engage in a full
consideration of the policy concerns that might bear on the desirability
of burden-shifting for employment discrimination claims. As in 1991,
the matter is likely to rest with Congress. As of this writing, bills are
pending in both Houses of Congress that would respond to Gross by
applying the statutory burden-shifting mechanism to a broad range of
federal discrimination and retaliation claims.22 Ironically, by signaling
its dissatisfaction with Price Waterhouse burden-shifting, the Gross Court
may have spurred a broader adoption of the statutory burden-shifting
framework.
I. The Gross Court’s Failure to Carry Its Burden of Proof
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc. provided four related rationales for its decision to reject
burden-shifting for ADEA discrimination claims.23 First, it reasoned
that Title VII’s statutory burden-shifting mechanism does not apply to
ADEA claims—a reasonable view, but one that did not resolve the applicability of non-statutory burden-shifting under Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.24 Next, it reasoned that the ADEA’s language foreclosed the
use of burden-shifting.25 Whatever the merits of this argument, the
Court had reached the opposite view concerning materially similar language in Price Waterhouse.26 The Gross Court, recognizing that it was repudiating Price Waterhouse, explained that it was appropriate to do so
because “it has become evident in the years since that case was decided
that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. For example, in
cases tried to a jury, courts have found it particularly difficult to craft an
instruction to explain its burden-shifting framework.” 27 Finally, the
20 See infra notes 302–427 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 400–427 and accompanying text.
22 See generally S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009).
23 See 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348, 2350, 2352 (2009).
24 Id. at 2348–49.
25 Id. at 2350.
26 See infra notes 57–64 and accompanying text.
27 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
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Gross Court suggested—as support for its rejection of Price Waterhouse—
that the 1991 Act foreclosed the continued application of Price Waterhouse to claims under the ADEA.28
Part I.A. analyzes these rationales and concludes that the linchpin
of the Gross Court’s analysis was its rejection of Price Waterhouse.29 Absent
a reason to depart from Price Waterhouse, the decision in Gross would be
difficult to justify. Yet the only cited rationale for the departure was the
notion that burden-shifting causes undue confusion.30 Part I.B. considers three possible arguments concerning confusion.31 It concludes that
the claim stated in Gross—that burden-shifting instructions are too difficult to craft—is unsupported.32 Two other types of confusion, however, deserve more serious consideration. First, there has been very real
confusion over the applicability of burden-shifting instructions.33 Gross
puts this type of confusion to rest, but it was not the only way to do
so.34 Second, there is the potential for confusion when multiple claims
go to a jury and different burden structures apply to different claims.35
Gross, if anything, heightens the risk of that type of confusion.
A. Gross’s Anatomy
To frame the analysis of Gross, it is useful to bear in mind that for
20 years a number of lower courts had assumed that Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting was available in ADEA cases.36 The Gross majority stated
that it refused to “extend” the Price Waterhouse framework to ADEA
claims—a wording choice that was presumably designed to underscore
the fact that the Price Waterhouse holding concerned Title VII claims and
not ADEA claims.37 This is true, but it is also the case that both the Price
Waterhouse dissent and the Price Waterhouse plurality discussed the new
framework’s application to ADEA claims (and other claims that would

28 Id. at 2349, 2351 n.5.
29 See infra notes 36–74 and accompanying text.
30 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
31 See infra notes 75–301 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 75–301 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 108–208 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 108–208 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 277–301 and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (citing Burns v. Gadsden State Cmty. Coll., 908 F.2d 1512, 1517–18 (11th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam) and Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568–69 (2d Cir.
1989)).
37 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
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be tried to a jury).38 Complaining that the new framework would sow
perplexity, the Price Waterhouse dissenters predicted that “[c]onfusion in
the application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute
in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), where courts borrow the Title VII order of
proof for the conduct of jury trials.”39 The plurality responded that
“[t]he dissent need not worry that this evidentiary scheme, if used during a jury trial, will be so impossibly confused and complex as it imagines. . . . Juries long have decided cases in which defendants raised
affirmative defenses.”40 Thus, at least seven justices viewed the decision
as setting a framework for discrimination claims under statutes other
than Title VII, including claims—such as ADEA claims—that carried
the right to a jury trial.41
How, then, did the Gross Court reach the opposite conclusion?
1. The Inapplicability of Statutory Burden-Shifting
The Supreme Court’s holding in Gross that §§ 2000e-2(m) and
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) are inapplicable to ADEA cases was not inevitable,
but it was unsurprising. By its terms, § 2000e-2(m) applies only to cases
in which it is claimed “that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor” for an employment practice—a list that does
not mention age discrimination.42 Section 2000e-5 is similarly inapplicable to ADEA actions.43
There is some evidence that during the drafting of the proposals
that led to the enactment of the 1991 Act, some participants did consider whether the new statutory approach to mixed-motive claims
should apply to ADEA claims.44 For instance, Reginald Govan recounts
his experiences “as a House Democratic staff member in the legislative
process that culminated in the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of

38 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 247 n.12 (plurality opinion).
39 Id. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 247 n.12 (plurality opinion).
41 See id. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 247 n.12 (plurality opinion).
42 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
43 See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (addressing “claim[s] in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title”).
44 See Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict
Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 35
(1993).
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1991.”45 Govan recalls the work of a group that set out to draft proposed legislation responding to Price Waterhouse and other cases:
Given the long history of reliance on Title VII precedent to
interpret the meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the drafting group discussed whether to
make proposed amendments to Title VII applicable to the
ADEA, and whether the failure to do so would leave courts
free to apply Wards Cove, Price Waterhouse, and Lorrance to age
discrimination claims.46
Govan’s account leaves unclear the upshot of the discussion.47
Some insight might be provided by a House Report on one of the
versions the House considered in the negotiations leading to the enactment of the 1991 Act.48 That report—in a section labeled “RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS MODELED AFTER TITLE VII” —states
as follows:
A number of other laws banning discrimination, including the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act . . . are modeled after, and
have been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII.
The Committee intends that these other laws modeled after
Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent
with Title VII as amended by this Act.49
This House Report, however, concerned a prior version of the bill;
some changes were made to the mixed-motives provision before its enactment as §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).50 In the end, this discussion in the House Report seems outweighed by the fact that
§§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) do not treat ADEA claims. Accordingly, even prior to Gross, commentators had concluded that the

45 Id. at 2 n.**.
46 Id. at 35 (footnote omitted).
47 The passage quoted in the text is a full paragraph. The next paragraph commences:
“Other proposals were not so easily dismissed.” Id. This transition leaves ambiguous just
what was “dismissed.”
48 Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694.
49 Id. at 4 (footnote and citation omitted).
50 See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1093, 1168–69
(1993); John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy
Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 Geo. L.J. 2009, 2048 (1995).
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statutory burden shift did not apply to ADEA claims.51 And even the
dissenters in Gross agreed that the statutory burden shift does not govern such claims.52
2. The ADEA’s Text
The Gross majority next focused on the ADEA’s text, which prohibits employers from taking various actions “because of” an employee’s
age.53 The Gross Court’s textual argument depends on two steps. First,
the Court determined that the statutory language directs the application of a “but for” causation standard.54 Second, the Court held that
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting is incompatible with such a standard.55
As the Price Waterhouse opinions illustrate, neither of these two conclusions is inevitable, and it is only when the two conclusions are combined that they foreclose the sort of burden-shifting undertaken in Price
Waterhouse.56
The Price Waterhouse Court confronted materially similar language:
a Title VII provision prohibiting employers from taking various actions
“because of” various employee attributes (including sex).57 Justice Bren51 See, e.g., Eglit, supra note 50, at 1106 (“[I]t seems analytically appropriate to conclude—even if one sympathetic to plaintiffs’ concerns would question from a policy perspective the validity of all or parts of the analyses put forth in Lorance, Price Waterhouse, and
Wards Cove—that those decisions have not been divested of their heavy analogical weight
for ADEA courts, given Congress’s failure to amend the ADEA to reject or curtail these
rulings.”).
52 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because the 1991 Act amended
only Title VII and not the ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court reasonably
declines to apply the amended provisions to the ADEA.”).
53 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) provides, inter alia, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age . . . .” 29 U.S.C.A § 623(a) (West
2008 & Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
54 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (“To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the
plain language of the ADEA . . . a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of
the employer’s adverse decision.”).
55 See id. at 2351 (“It follows . . . that under § 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse
action.”).
56 Indeed, as Justice Kennedy pointed out in Price Waterhouse, “the plurality’s theory of
Title VII causation is ultimately consistent with a but-for standard . . . .” 490 U.S. at 283
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57 Then, as now, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 provided in part that “[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
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nan, writing for the plurality, probably would have agreed with the second of the Gross Court’s propositions, but he rejected the first: The plurality concluded that the statutory language did not denote but-for causation.58 The plurality presumably reasoned that if but-for causation was
required, then—as Price Waterhouse contended59—a burden-shifting
framework would be inappropriate. By contrast, Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in the judgment in Price Waterhouse foreshadowed the first
of the Gross Court’s propositions while rejecting the second.60 Justice
O’Connor argued that even though “because of” denotes “but for” causation,61 that conclusion need not foreclose burden-shifting: “The question for decision in this case is what allocation of the burden of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms with the intent of Congress
and the purposes behind Title VII.”62 Justice White eschewed both these
“semantic discussions” and relied simply on a precedent from the § 1983
context, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.63
Although no five justices in Price Waterhouse agreed on a particular
textual analysis, the fact remains that six justices held in that case that
the “because of” language in Title VII permitted burden-shifting. It
would be difficult to justify reaching a different conclusion concerning
the same language in the ADEA without rejecting Price Waterhouse.
3. Rejecting Price Waterhouse
As noted above, the Gross majority rested its rejection of the Price
Waterhouse burden-shifting framework partly on the assertion that the
framework is confusing for juries:

58 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (plurality opinion) (“We take these words to
mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. To construe the words
‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation,’ as does Price Waterhouse, is to
misunderstand them.”); see also id. at 241 (“When . . . an employer considers both gender
and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex
and the other, legitimate considerations—even if we may say later, in the context of litigation, that the decision would have been the same if gender had not been taken into account.”).
59 See Brief for the Petitioner at *18, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167), 1988
WL 1025858.
60 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
61 See id. at 262–63 (“I disagree with the plurality’s dictum that the words ‘because of’
do not mean ‘but-for’ causation; manifestly they do.”).
62 Id. at 263.
63 Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). For a discussion of Mt. Healthy,
see infra notes 310–342 and accompanying text.
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Whatever the deficiencies of Price Waterhouse in retrospect, it
has become evident in the years since that case was decided
that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. For example, in cases tried to a jury, courts have found it particularly
difficult to craft an instruction to explain its burden-shifting
framework . . . . Thus, even if Price Waterhouse was doctrinally
sound, the problems associated with its application have
eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its framework
to ADEA claims.64
In Part I.B., I conclude that this claim of jury confusion is unsupported.65 To the extent that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting gives rise to
confusion, I argue that the confusion arises from two other problems
not specifically identified by the Gross Court, and I suggest that the
Gross Court did not adopt the best strategy for ameliorating the confusion. For the moment, however, it suffices to note that this is the fulcrum of the Court’s opinion: To justify its textual analysis of the ADEA,
the Court was obliged to explain why Price Waterhouse’s holding concerning the same language in Title VII was inapplicable; and to explain
its repudiation of Price Waterhouse, the Court relied centrally on the notion that burden-shifting causes undue confusion.66
4. The 1991 Act’s Effect on Burden-Shifting for ADEA Claims
The Court did adduce one further basis for rejecting Price Waterhouse: in a footnote, the Court suggested that the 1991 Act itself forecloses the application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting under the
ADEA.67 As noted above, the conclusion that the 1991 Act’s burdenshifting scheme does not cover ADEA claims is neither surprising nor
particularly controversial.68 But the Gross majority went further, arguing
that Congress’s choice to provide for statutory burden-shifting in the
Title VII context without doing the same for ADEA claims forecloses
the continued application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to ADEA
claims.69 This step in the Court’s argument is unpersuasive.70
64 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
65 See infra notes 79–107 and accompanying text.
66 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
67 See id. at 2351 n.5.
68 See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.
69 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.5.
70 For a thoughtful critique of this aspect of the Gross Court’s reasoning, see Katz, supra
note 16, at 871–72.
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The Gross majority reasoned as follows: Congress amended both
Title VII and the ADEA in the 1991 Act, but chose not to add to the
ADEA any provisions similar to §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).71
The Court asserted that “[w]hen Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”72 In
this instance, the Gross majority implied, Congress’s inaction indicated
an intent to displace the use of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting in the
ADEA context:
Congress not only explicitly added “motivating factor” liability
to Title VII . . . but it also partially abrogated Price Waterhouse’s holding by eliminating an employer’s complete affirmative defense to “motivating factor” claims, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). If such “motivating factor” claims were
already part of Title VII, the addition of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
alone would have been sufficient. Congress’ careful tailoring
of the “motivating factor” claim in Title VII, as well as the absence of a provision parallel to § 2000e-2(m) in the ADEA,
confirms that we cannot transfer the Price Waterhouse burdenshifting framework into the ADEA.73
Contrary to the Gross Court’s assertion, under Price Waterhouse motivating factor claims were already part of Title VII. The problem that
Congress evidently sought to remedy was that the Price Waterhouse samedecision defense gave the employer a complete defense to liability, not
just to damages. The 1991 Act changed that framework, for the purposes of Title VII claims, to one in which the employer’s same-decision
defense merely limits certain types of remedies. To effectuate that purpose, it arguably would not have sufficed (pace the Gross majority)
merely to add § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)’s limits on remedies, because under
Price Waterhouse if the defendant proved the same-decision defense one
never arrived at the remedy stage.
Moreover, the Gross Court’s apparent assertion that the 1991 Act
forecloses the applicability of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to ADEA
claims would seem to fly in the face of Congress’s overall intent in enacting the legislation. For one thing, as the Gross dissenters observed,
“Congress emphasized in passing the 1991 Act that the motivatingfactor test was consistent with its original intent in enacting Title VII.”74
71 See Gross 129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.5.
72 Id. at 2349.
73 Id. at 2351 n.5.
74 Id. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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For another, to the extent that Congress addressed the Price Waterhouse
issue at all, it was to alter its framework—for the purpose of Title VII
claims—in a way that was believed to make claims easier to prove. Such
an intent would seem inconsistent with an intent to make ADEA claims
harder to prove by removing the availability of Price Waterhouse burdenshifting.
In sum, this Part has identified four arguments at work in Gross.
The argument discussed in Part I.A.1 is reasonable but inapposite. The
argument discussed in Part I.A.4 is implausible. The argument discussed
in Part I.A.2 depends for its persuasiveness on the decision to repudiate
Price Waterhouse. And, as noted in Part I.A.3, the repudiation of Price
Waterhouse rests centrally upon the contention that burden-shifting is
unduly confusing. It is to that contention that I return in Part I.B.
B. Three Types of Confusion
When assessing the contention that Price Waterhouse burdenshifting should be rejected because it causes undue confusion, it makes
sense to begin with the type of confusion alluded to in Gross. Accordingly, Part I.B.1 examines the evidence for the Gross Court’s assertion
that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting instructions are inherently confusing.75 Although this evidence is at best inconclusive, there are two other
types of confusion that could ground a more persuasive critique of Price
Waterhouse. Part I.B.2 examines one potent source of confusion—the
difficulties of delineating when to give a burden-shifting instruction
and when to give a burden-retaining instruction with respect to a type
of claim concerning which burden-shifting is potentially applicable.76
That sort of confusion is likely to afflict the judges charged with formulating (or reviewing) jury instructions. Part I.B.3 notes that Gross’s application may extend beyond ADEA discrimination claims and briefly
surveys the case’s possible impact on other types of employment
claims.77 This analysis lays the groundwork for my examination, in Part
I.B.4, of a different type of confusion—namely, that which arises when
juries hear multiple claims that are subject to differing burden frameworks.78

75 See infra notes 79–107 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 108–208 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 209–275 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 277–295 and accompanying text.
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1. Are Burden-Shifting Instructions Inherently Confusing?
To inform our analysis of the Gross Court’s jury-confusion rationale, it may be helpful to consider the sort of instruction that a court
might have given in an ADEA mixed-motive case prior to Gross:79
In this case Mr. Jones is alleging that that Acme Corp. violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act when it fired
him. To win on this claim, Mr. Jones must prove both of the
following by a preponderance of the evidence:
First: Acme fired Mr. Jones; and
Second: Mr. Jones’ age was a motivating factor in Acme’s
decision.
In showing that his age was a motivating factor for Acme’s
action, Mr. Jones is not required to prove that his age was the
sole motivation or even the primary motivation for Acme’s
decision. Mr. Jones need only prove that his age played a motivating part in Acme’s decision even though other factors
may also have motivated Acme.
If you find in Mr. Jones’ favor with respect to each of the
facts that he must prove, you must then decide whether Acme
has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have fired Mr. Jones regardless of his age. Your verdict must
be for Acme if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have fired Mr. Jones even if his age had played
no role in the decision.
Is this sort of instruction too confusing for juries? For comparison purposes, here is a “determinative factor” instruction (given in cases where
burden-shifting does not apply):80
79 For the instructions actually given in Gross, see Joint Appendix at *9–10, Gross, 129 S.
Ct. 2343 (No. 080-441), 2009 WL 192466.
80 The examples given in the text are deliberately simplified. For example, it is standard in a determinative-factor instruction to include a discussion of pretext. The instruction might state, for example: “Acme has stated that it fired Mr. Jones because he was careless in his work habits. If you disbelieve Acme’s explanation for firing Mr. Jones, then you
may, but need not, find that Mr. Jones has proved intentional discrimination.”
Although it is common to distinguish between the burden-retaining and burdenshifting frameworks by referring to the “McDonnell Douglas framework” and the “Price Waterhouse framework,” this shorthand should not be taken to suggest that burden-retaining
instructions should include a discussion of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine structure, under
which the plaintiff sets out a prima facie case, the defendant articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, and the plaintiff rebuts the defendant’s
stated reason. That structure drops out of the picture at trial and there is no reason to
discuss it in the jury instructions. See Gerrilyn G. Brill, Instructing the Jury in an Employment
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In this case Mr. Jones is alleging that that Acme Corp. violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act when it fired
him. To win on this claim, Mr. Jones must prove both of the
following by a preponderance of the evidence:
First: Acme fired Mr. Jones; and
Second: Mr. Jones’ age was a determinative factor in Acme’s
decision.
“Determinative factor” means that if not for Mr. Jones’ age,
Acme would not have fired him.
Comparing the two instructions, one can see that they both present the
question of but-for causation. The burden-shifting instruction, however,
breaks the causation question down into two steps and shifts the burden to the defendant at the second step. It is not clear why this would
be unduly confusing for juries. Juries in employment discrimination
cases, like juries in other cases, may deal with a number of affirmative
defenses on which the defendant has the burden of proof.81 Moreover,
if additional clarity is desired, the court can ask the jury to answer both
of the two questions—motivating-factor and same-decision—on a special verdict form.82
In any event, the authorities the Gross Court cited in support of
that assertion provide no evidence on the question.83 Moreover, other
available data do not permit us to measure in any systematic way
whether a burden-shifting instruction confuses jurors.
As evidence that “courts have found it particularly difficult to craft
an instruction to explain [Price Waterhouse’s] burden-shifting framework,” the Gross Court cited two sources: the Second Circuit’s 1992
Discrimination Case, 1998 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 2, 9; Susan K. Grebeldinger, Instructing the Jury
in a Case of Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment: Thoroughness or Simplicity?, 12 Lab.
Law. 399, 419 (1997); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229, 2323 (1995).
81 A notable example is the employer’s defense to liability in a hostile-environment
case in which no tangible employment action was taken:
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . . The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
82 See Brill, supra note 80, at 4.
83 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
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opinion in Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. and a 1991 dissent by Judge
Flaum in Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc.84 Both sources had
been similarly cited by the respondent in Gross for the proposition that
“courts have found Price Waterhouse hard to implement in the jury trial
context.”85 Neither source supports the Court’s assertion.
The Tyler court did indeed refer to “the murky water of shifting
burdens in discrimination cases.”86 But this remark in Tyler—a case addressing a claim under New York’s Human Rights Law—likely referred
to other doctrinal complexities. The court may, for example, have been
alluding to the direct/circumstantial evidence dichotomy that the U.S.
Supreme Court would later address in Desert Palace v. Costa,87 or perhaps to the question of whether the 1991 Act’s statutory burdenshifting scheme should affect the interpretation of New York’s Human
Rights Law.88 In any event, it does not appear that the Tyler court was
addressing the inherent difficulty of crafting a burden-shifting instruction. In fact, the Tyler court specifically approved a Price Waterhouse burden-shifting instruction:
[A]n instruction which allows the jury to determine (1)
whether an illegitimate criterion was a substantial or motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, and (2) if so,
whether the employer has met its burden of proving that the
employment decision would have happened anyway, properly
captures the import of the Human Rights Law (or ADEA, or
title VII).89
In Visser, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the Price
Waterhouse burden-shifting framework applied to ADEA cases, but it af84 Id. at 2352 (citing Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179 (2d Cir.
1992); Visser, 924 F.2d at 661 (Flaum, J., dissenting)).
85 Brief for Respondent at *33, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 507026;
accord id. at *33–34, *33 n.25.
86 Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1179.
87 See id. at 1180 (noting that the defendant “claims that . . . Price Waterhouse requires
the plaintiff to produce ‘direct evidence’ of discrimination before the defendant can be
saddled with the burden of proving that the same action would have been taken even in
the absence of impermissible factors . . .”); id. at 1183 (stating that the court’s “biggest
problem” is “whether Price Waterhouse requires the plaintiff to show ‘direct evidence’ of
discrimination as a precondition to shifting into mixed-motives analysis”).
88 See id. at 1182 (“Because New York courts have in the past turned to federal law for
guidance in administering the Human Rights Law, this amendment may have potential
importance for future cases under the New York law. However, since New York courts have
not yet spoken on the subject, we will not attempt to apply the new federal statute in this
case.”).
89 Id. at 1187.
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firmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant because it
held that the plaintiff had failed to show that age was a “substantial factor” in his firing. 90 Judge Flaum dissented, arguing that summary
judgment was inappropriate. 91 In the course of the dissent, Judge
Flaum observed: “The difficulty judges have in formulating [burdenshifting] instructions and jurors have in applying them can be seen in
the fact that jury verdicts in ADEA cases are supplanted by judgments
notwithstanding the verdict or reversed on appeal more frequently
than jury verdicts generally.”92 Judge Flaum’s sole support for this contention was a 1987 note by a student, Kimberlye K. Fayssoux.93 Interestingly, Justice Kennedy had cited the same student note in his Price
Waterhouse dissent for the proposition that there was a “high reversal
rate caused by [the] use of Title VII burden shifting in a jury setting.”94
There are two problems with the citation of Fayssoux’s note for the
proposition that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting confuses juries. First,
Fayssoux focused her analysis not on the mixed-motive/same-decision
framework that would later be approved in Price Waterhouse, but rather
on “the difficulties encountered in applying the McDonnell Douglas
standard to age discrimination cases tried by jury.”95 Second, although
it is true that Fayssoux asserted that “a review of ADEA cases illustrates
that the courts are overturning jury verdicts at an alarming rate[,]”
Fayssoux cited no evidence that would permit a conclusion concerning
the rate at which jury verdicts are overturned in ADEA cases.96 Her
body of evidence on the subject appears in two footnotes, which cite
four cases in which a district court granted defendants’ J.N.O.V. motions;97 eight cases in which lower-court denials of J.N.O.V. were reversed on appeal;98 and five cases in which an appellate court affirmed
the grant of J.N.O.V.99 Leaving aside the fact that all these cases dated
from the 1980s, the basic problem is that citing seventeen cases in
which J.N.O.V. was granted tells us nothing about the rate at which jury
90 Visser, 924 F.2d at 658, 660, abrogated by Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
91 Id. at 662 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 661.
93 See id. (citing Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 Va. L. Rev. 601, 601 & nn.14–15, 606 (1987)).
94 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Fayssoux, supra
note 93).
95 Fayssoux, supra note 93, at 604.
96 Id. at 615 n.90.
97 See id. at 603 n.14.
98 See id. at 603 n.15.
99 See id.
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verdicts are overturned in ADEA cases and, therefore, provides no basis
for comparing that rate to the rate at which jury verdicts are overturned in other types of cases.
If the Gross Court had wished to examine data on reversals of jury
verdicts in employment discrimination cases, there exist better data on
that question—but it would be difficult to derive from those data any
inferences concerning the functioning of Price Waterhouse burden shifting. For example, evidence is available concerning the rate of appellate
reversals in employment discrimination cases that progressed all the
way through trial.100 Kevin Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart
Schwab used a data set containing information on federal court employment discrimination cases to study dispositions on appeal during
the period from 1987 to 2000.101 They found that, for cases decided
after trial, appeals were taken in 16.55% of the cases.102 In those cases,
the reversal rate varied dramatically depending on which side took the
appeal: defendants obtained reversals in over 42% of their appeals,
while plaintiffs obtained reversals in less than 7% of their appeals.103
The authors point out that the defendants’ reversal rate is unusually
high (relative to almost all other types of cases), and that the plaintiffs’
reversal rate is unusually low by the same measure.104
Do these figures reveal anything about Price Waterhouse instructions? The types of cases that the study included could have featured a
Price Waterhouse-style burden-shifting instruction because they involved
types of claims for which such a burden-shifting instruction is (or has
been) sometimes used.105 But not all cases go to the jury on a burdenshifting motivating-factor instruction; some (probably most) instead go
the jury on a burden-retaining “determinative factor” instruction.106
100 See Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 Employee Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 547, 554 display 3 (2003).
101 See id. at 548–50.
102 Id. at 551 display 1. In cases where the plaintiff won at trial, appeals were taken almost thirteen percent of the time, while in cases where the defendant won at trial, appeals
were taken slightly over eighteen percent of the time. See id. Defendant wins at trial were
considerably more frequent than plaintiff wins at trial. See id.
103 See id. at 554 display 3.
104 See id. at 556 display 4, 557–58 display 5.
105 The “Jobs 442” case category that defined the data set included claims under Title
VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the ADEA, the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), § 1981, and § 1983. Id. at 549.
106 See Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 Emory L.J. 1887, 1942 (2004) (asserting that “the vast majority
of individual discrimination cases have been treated as McDonnell Douglas cases” rather
than as Price Waterhouse cases).
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Without knowing which type of instruction was employed in each case
and without knowing whether a problem with the instruction was the
cause for reversal on appeal, it is impossible to know whether the reversal rate reveals anything about problems with burden-shifting jury instructions. It is, however, possible to make an educated guess. In other
work, Clermont and Schwab have found that employment discrimination plaintiffs do worse than other types of plaintiffs at each stage of
federal litigation (not merely on appeal):
They manage many fewer happy resolutions early in litigation,
and so they have to proceed toward trial more often. They win
a lower proportion of cases during pretrial and at trial. Then,
more of their successful cases are appealed. On appeal, they
have a harder time upholding their successes and reversing
adverse outcomes.107
In the light of these data, it would hardly be surprising to find that jury
verdicts in ADEA cases are overturned more often than jury verdicts in
general—and such a finding would not provide particular support for
the view that confusion concerning a burden-shifting instruction was
the explanation for decisions to overturn jury verdicts in ADEA cases.
In sum, even if the Gross Court had looked for better evidence concerning the effect of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting instructions, it
seems doubtful that any such evidence would have come to light.
2. Confusion over Applicability of Burden-Shifting Instructions
Perhaps—although the Gross opinion did not mention it—the concern over administrability of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting stemmed
instead from the difficulties courts have experienced in discerning when
a case merits a burden-shifting instruction as opposed to a burdenretaining instruction. Judging from the oral argument in Gross, concern
over this type of confusion did trouble some justices, which is unsurprising, given that the petition in Gross sought guidance on precisely this
question.108 In fact, the boundaries of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
107 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 429, 429 (2004).
108 See Transcript of Oral Argument at *7, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL
832958 ( Justice Alito: “[I]f there is a direct evidence requirement, it may arguably cause a
great deal of problem [sic] when the trial judge has to give an instruction to the jury, because then the—the jury will first have to decide whether a particular type of evidence is
present in the case before it can tell what—who has the burden of proof and what the
standard is . . . .”); id. at *16 ( Justice Kennedy: “[A]re there any tactical difficulties or
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have always been contested. It was clear from the start that difficult
questions would arise concerning the applicability of the Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting scheme. During the drafting of the Price Waterhouse opinions, the reach of the burden-shifting mechanism was a central focus of
negotiations among the justices.109 After the release of those opinions,
the controversy continued, with courts developing divergent views concerning the range of cases to which the burden-shifting scheme could
apply.110 Neither the 1991 Act nor the Court’s 2003 decision in Desert
Palace has settled the question.
The Court’s 1977 decision in Mt. Healthy anchored much of the
Court’s later discussion of burden-shifting in Price Waterhouse.111 In Mt.
Healthy, which involved a First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court
held that if the plaintiff proved that the impermissible motive was “a
‘substantial factor’ —or, to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’” in the challenged decision, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove that it would have made the same decision anyway.112
As noted below, it appears that the second of these two alternatives—
motivating factor—was added after Justice Marshall expressed concern
about a prior draft’s use of the terms “substantial factor” and “significant role.”113 Less than six years later, in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., a unanimous Court approved a test employed by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) for adjudicating claims that a
worker was discharged based on mixed motives, one of which was the
worker’s union activity.114 The Court used a number of different formulations when describing the NLRB’s test: “contributed to,” “in any way
motivated by,” “based in whole or in part on,” and (twice) “a substantial
or motivating factor.”115 And the Court characterized the Mt. Healthy
standard as directing a court to ask whether “protected expression
played a role in the employer’s decision.”116
strategic difficulties that counsel face if they don’t quite know which way the burden is
going to shift before trial . . . .”).
109 See infra notes 121–140.
110 See infra notes 155–164 and accompanying text.
111 See generally Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274.
112 Id. at 287 (citation omitted).
113 See infra notes 323–330 and accompanying text.
114 462 U.S. 393, 394–95 (1983). For an account by “one of the NLRB attorneys who
developed the agency’s strategy in the Wright Line/Transportation Management litigation[,]”
see Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 163, 190 (2007) (describing “the active role that lawyers played in
arguing across . . . doctrinal borders”).
115 Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 395, 399, 400–01.
116 Id. at 403.
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During oral argument in Price Waterhouse, both the advocates and
some of the justices discussed the applicability of Mt. Healthy.117 Pressing Price Waterhouse’s lawyer, for instance, Justice O’Connor asked,
“you argue for some ‘but for’ standard of causation? Or are you willing
to settle for a substantial factor?”118 The lawyer responded that she
would choose the “but for” standard; but a few minutes later, Justice
O’Connor once again alluded to the Mt. Healthy test.119 In turn, Hopkins’s lawyer relied on the Mt. Healthy test, but (with a nod to Transportation Management) added the alternative formulation “played a role.”120
In early December 1988 Justice Brennan circulated the first draft
of an opinion in Price Waterhouse. 121 Justices Marshall and Stevens
promptly agreed to join the opinion, while Justice Kennedy accepted
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s invitation to write a dissent. 122 Justice
O’Connor, however, wrote to express three concerns with the draft
opinion.123 Among other things, Justice O’Connor worried that the
draft’s use of the phrase “played a part” would give plaintiffs recourse
to the burden-shifting framework too often.124 Noting that Mt. Healthy
used the terms “‘substantial’ or ‘motivating factor’” and that this language was repeated in Transportation Management, Justice O’Connor
argued that the draft opinion should always use these formulations
rather than what she viewed as the looser term “played a part”:
I much prefer to retain the “substantial or motivating” factor
language . . . as I think it more clearly suggests that stray re117 Audio Tape: The Oyez Project, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins—Oral Argument (Oct. 31,
1988), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980–1989/1988/1988_87_1167/argument.
118 Id. at 4:20.
119 See id. at 9:32 (“Well, there’s language in a number of cases out there that it’s
enough to show that the discriminatory reason was a substantial factor.”).
120 See id. at 32:17 ( James H. Heller argued for the respondent: “What we believe the
Plaintiff must show is clearly marked by this Court’s decisions. A motivating factor, a substantial factor. And Transportation Management, I believe, characterized Mt. Healthy as
saying, played a role.”).
121 See First Draft, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167) (circulated by Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. on Dec. 8, 1988). Citations to internal memoranda and other internal Court documents concerning Price Waterhouse are to items in Box 519 of the Papers
of Justice Harry A. Blackmun at the Library of Congress.
122 See generally Memorandum from Justice Marshall to Justice Brennan (Dec. 9, 1988)
(on file with author); Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan (Dec. 9,
1988) (on file with author); Memorandum from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice Kennedy (Dec. 9, 1988) (on file with author); Memorandum from Justice Kennedy to Chief
Justice Rehnquist (Dec. 9, 1988) (on file with author).
123 See generally Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan (Dec. 13,
1988) (on file with author).
124 Id. at 1–2.
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marks at the workplace, even by those responsible for management decisions, do not in and of themselves require a
burden shift to the employer. The illegitimate criterion must
actually have been relied upon by the decisionmaker in the
case at hand.125
Justice Brennan responded by thanking Justice O’Connor for her
“extensive and helpful memo;” he expressed a willingness to make
changes in response to some of her suggestions, but he took issue with
others. 126 Focusing on Justice O’Connor’s concern about “stray remarks,” Justice Brennan proposed to add language stating as follows:
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not, in
and of themselves, indicate that gender played a part in a particular employment decision. Rather, the plaintiff must show
that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its
decision. This is not to say, however, that such remarks cannot
be evidence that gender played such a part.127
As one can see from the preceding quotation, Justice Brennan was unwilling to give up reliance on the term “played a part.” As he explained:
I prefer to allay your concern in this fashion rather than by
adding the “substantial factor” language throughout the opinion. Such language, I think, deflects attention from the important question in a case of this kind, which is whether gender was a consideration in an employment decision . . . .
[T]he language and legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that gender is irrelevant to such decisions. To add the
wording that you suggest might be taken to mean that some
discrimination in employment decisions is acceptable, as long
as it is not “substantial.”128
125 Id. Justice O’Connor also expressed concern about the draft’s characterization of
the McDonnell Douglas test and about the draft’s explanation of the nature of the employer’s burden on the same-decision defense. See id. at 2–5. Justice White followed Justice
O’Connor’s memorandum with one of his own urging Justice Brennan to “give favorable
consideration to Sandra’s suggestions, particularly her third one” (i.e., the point concerning the employer’s burden). See Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Brennan
(Dec. 13, 1988.)
126 Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice O’Connor 1 (Dec. 14, 1988) (on file
with author).
127 Id.
128 Id. In the margin next to this paragraph, Justice Blackmun wrote “good” and “correct.” Id.
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Justice O’Connor’s response indicates that Justice Brennan had
narrowed the scope of her concerns, which now focused largely on her
preference for the term “substantial factor”:
[M]y main concern remaining is the threshold proof necessary to allow a plaintiff to take advantage of the favorable evidentiary framework of Price Waterhouse . . . . Unless it is made
clear that this evidentiary framework is not to be invoked
unless a forbidden criterion was a “substantial factor” in the
employment decision, I may be forced to limit my concurrence to the judgment.129
Although Justice O’Connor cited a number of arguments in favor of
her preferred language—for example, that the language appeared in
Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management and in lower court employment-discrimination case law—her underlying concern appears to have
been that shifting the burden to the defendant would be “strong medicine” that should be carefully controlled:
I view the evidentiary rule of Price Waterhouse as a supplement
to the McDonnell Douglas framework for use in cases, like this
one, where the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an irrelevant
characteristic. In such a situation, I agree that a strong deterrent message is needed. I think the “substantial factor” test
gives trial judges the discretion to determine when this tool is
necessary and when it is not.130
A few days later, Justice Blackmun agreed to join Justice Brennan’s
opinion.131 Justice Blackmun’s law clerk had expressed the hope that if
Justice Blackmun joined the opinion, “perhaps Justice White would
provide the necessary fifth [vote].”132 No such vote was forthcoming,
however, and there the matter sat until after the New Year.
In early January 1989, Justice Brennan wrote to Justice O’Connor
that he remained “strongly inclined against adding the ‘substantial fac129 Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan 3 (Dec. 16, 1988) (on file
with author).
130 Id. at 1, 2.
131 Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan 1 (Dec. 19, 1988) (on file
with author).
132 Memorandum from “Eddie” to Justice Blackmun 1 (Dec. 17, 1988) (on file with author). The law clerk reported that Justice Brennan’s clerk was “fuming” in reaction to Justice O’Connor’s memo. Id.
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tor’ language to this opinion.”133 Justice Brennan argued that the term
“substantial factor” was used in Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management “not in order to suggest that the discrimination must be of a certain magnitude before the burden must shift, but in order to drive
home the point that an impermissible motive must actually play a part
in an employment decision in order to justify such a shift.”134 He acknowledged, however, that this was not the only possible reading of the
term, and he asserted that he wished to avoid the ambiguity that would
result from perpetuating the “substantial factor” language as the test in
Price Waterhouse.135 These arguments failed to sway Justice O’Connor;
she promptly responded that she planned to write separately.136 This
response elicited a concession from Justice Brennan, who stated that in
order to win Justice O’Connor’s support for the draft he would agree to
insert “motivating” before “part” in various places where the draft currently used the term “play a part.”137
Perhaps such a concession, if it had come earlier, would have persuaded Justice O’Connor to join Justice Brennan’s opinion. But her
response to Justice Brennan indicates that before she received his offer,
she “had concluded that our differences in this case went beyond mere
linguistics, and had begun work on a concurring opinion.” 138 She
agreed that the changes Justice Brennan proposed “would be helpful”
and “certainly could change the bottom line” on any opinion she
wrote, but she stated that she would need to write her thoughts down in
order to assess the question.139
It was still unclear at this point whether Justice Brennan would
gain a fifth vote in support of his opinion; Justice White had indicated
that he would wait to see Justice O’Connor’s draft. 140 Accordingly,
when Justice Kennedy circulated the first draft of his dissent, he warned
that Justice Brennan’s approach “will mean that almost every Title VII
133 Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice O’Connor 3 ( Jan. 5, 1989) (on file
with author).
134 Id. at 1.
135 See id.
136 See Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan 1 ( Jan. 5, 1989) (on
file with author).
137 See Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice O’Connor 1 ( Jan. 6, 1989) (on
file with author).
138 Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan 1 ( Jan. 10, 1989) (on file
with author).
139 Id.
140 See Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Brennan 1 (Feb. 13, 1989) (on file
with author).
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plaintiff will be able to claim that her case is one of ‘mixed motives.’”141
He reasoned that plaintiffs ordinarily do not sue unless they have more
than a mere prima facie case: “Almost all plaintiffs will bring at least
some additional evidence suggesting discrimination. When they do, the
‘motivating factor’ standard will be met, and the ultimate burden of
persuasion shifted to the defendant.”142
Ultimately, Justice O’Connor and Justice White each wrote separately, with the well-known result that Justice Brennan wrote only for a
plurality.143 The plurality opinion used the “played a motivating part”
standard at key points (such as when the plurality summed up its holding), but retained the “played a part” language in other places.144 Justice White relied on Mt. Healthy and concluded that “as Justice
O’Connor states, [plaintiff’s] burden was to show that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action.”145 Justice O’Connor, for her part, indicated that she would require the plaintiff to produce “direct” evidence that the invidious motive was a “substantial factor” in the decision in order to qualify for Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting. 146 She reasoned that such burden-shifting diverged
from the Court’s existing McDonnell Douglas proof structure and that, as
such, the burden-shifting mechanism “requires justification, and its outlines should be carefully drawn.”147 She enumerated types of evidence
that would not suffice:
[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of
sexual harassment . . . cannot justify requiring the employer
to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on
legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers,
or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional
process itself . . . .148
In Justice O’Connor’s view, to qualify for burden-shifting the plaintiff
must present “direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial

141 First draft at 13, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167) (circulated by Justice
Kennedy, dissenting, on Feb. 14, 1989).
142 Id. at 14.
143 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231 (plurality opinion); id. at 258 (White, concurring in the judgment); id at 261 (O’Connor, concurring in the judgment).
144 See, e.g., id. at 244–45, 246, 247 n.12, 258 (plurality opinion).
145 Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
146 Id. at 271, 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
147 Id. at 270.
148 Id. at 277.
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negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.”149
Justice Kennedy, meanwhile, had revised his dissent to reflect the
narrowness of Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment.150 Citing her opinion and Justice White’s opinion, the dissenters argued that
the result—under the Price Waterhouse opinions—would be that “[t]he
shift in the burden of persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff proves by
direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor actually
relied upon in making the decision.” 151 Rather than decrying the
breadth of the burden-shifting mechanism (as the first draft did), the
published dissent stressed the “limited” and “closely defined” scope of
the mechanism.152 But the dissenters also pointed out that these limitations would cause their own problems by requiring the lower courts to
parse the meaning of “substantial” and to apply “the often subtle and
difficult distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ or ‘circumstantial’
evidence.”153 The dissenters further asserted that “[c]onfusion in the
application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute in
cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), where courts borrow the Title VII order of
proof for the conduct of jury trials.”154
In the years following Price Waterhouse, a number of courts concluded that the direct/circumstantial distinction provided the dividing
line between cases that warranted burden-shifting and those that did
not. To justify Price Waterhouse burden-shifting, those courts required
“direct evidence” that an invidious motive as well as a legitimate motive
drove the relevant decision.155 As the Gross dissenters would later point
149 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S at 277.
150 See id. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
151 Id.
152 See id.; First draft at 13, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167) (circulated by
Justice Kennedy, dissenting, on Feb. 14, 1989).
153 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 292.
155 Relevant cases include those applying the non-statutory (Price Waterhouse) burdenshifting mechanism to types of claims that they did not regard as encompassed within the
statutory burden-shifting scheme. See, e.g., Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d
409, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff alleging Title VII retaliation may establish her
case for causation in one of two ways: she may either present direct evidence of retaliation,
which is also known as the ‘mixed-motive’ method of proving retaliatory motivation; or she
may provide circumstantial evidence creating a rebuttable presumption of retaliation.”);
Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 571 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (ADEA
claim); Vesprini v. Shaw Contract Flooring Servs., Inc., 315 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2002) (observing that the “contours” of the direct-evidence requirement were “murky” but nonetheless applying it in an ADEA case); E.E.O.C. v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 922 (8th
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out, this conclusion was dubious given that neither the Price Waterhouse
plurality nor Justice White mentioned any requirement of “direct evidence.”156 But Justice O’Connor’s approach nonetheless gained currency. The analysis was further complicated by the fact that the 1991
Act replaced Price Waterhouse for Title VII discrimination claims with the
statutory burden-shifting mechanism found in §§ 2000e-2(m) and
2000e-5(g)(2)(B).157 A number of courts applied the direct-evidence
requirement when administering the statutory mechanism as well.158
As Justice Kennedy predicted, the line between direct and circumstantial evidence proved difficult to draw, and courts took varying positions.159 The First Circuit’s widely-cited decision in Fernandes v. Costa
Bros. Masonry classified the circuits’ approaches into “three schools of
thought.”160 First, it noted the “Classic” position, under which courts
hold “that the term [direct evidence] signifies evidence which, if believed, suffices to prove the fact of discriminatory animus without inference, presumption, or resort to other evidence.”161 A second approach is the “Animus Plus” position, which defines direct evidence “as
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, of conduct or statements that
(1) reflect directly the alleged discriminatory animus and (2) bear
squarely on the contested employment decision.” 162 The Fernandes
court noted that “[c]ourts endorsing the animus plus position do not
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence in the classic
sense but, rather, emphasize that the mixed-motive trigger depends on
Cir. 2002) (ADEA claim); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2002) (ADEA
claim).
156 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because Justice White provided a fifth vote for the rationale explaining the result of the Price Waterhouse decision, his
concurrence is properly understood as controlling, and he, like the plurality, did not require the introduction of direct evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
157 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
158 See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Desert
Palace, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
159 See, e.g., Fakete, 308 F.3d at 338 n.2 (“[W]hile courts agree on what is not direct evidence—e.g., statements by non-decisionmakers, statements by decisionmakers unrelated to
the contested employment decision, and other ‘stray remarks’ —there is no consensus on
what is.”); Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1912 (“Creating two separate methods of analysis
and drawing the boundary between them based on the characterization of ‘direct’ evidence set up a structure for individual disparate treatment law that proved impossible to
implement coherently.”).
160 199 F.3d 572, 582 (1st Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, 539 U.S.
90 (2003).
161 Id.
162 Id.
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the strength of the plaintiff’s case.”163 Third, the court described the
“Animus” position, under which “as long as the evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) is tied to the alleged discriminatory animus, it
need not bear squarely on the challenged employment decision.”164
In Desert Palace, the Court granted certiorari on two questions:
whether the direct-evidence requirement applied to Title VII’s statutory
burden-shifting mechanism and, if so, what the contours of that directevidence requirement should be.165 The Court, however, avoided the
second question by answering the first question in the negative.166 The
Court focused on statutory text: § 2000e-2(m) establishes a violation
“when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor.”167 Section 2000e(m)
defines “demonstrates” to mean meets “the burdens of production and
persuasion.”168 Other parts of Title VII—including § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B),
which defines the same-decision defense—use the term “demonstrates,” and there is no indication that the term should include a direct-evidence requirement when used in one provision but not in another.169 Absent a contrary indication in the statute, the Court declined
to depart from the general practice of permitting proof by both direct
and circumstantial evidence.170 As the Court explained, “[t]he reason
for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and
deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’”171
As a result, the Desert Palace Court explained, “[i]n order to obtain
an instruction under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice.’”172 But what does this
requirement actually mean? The description “sufficient evidence to
find that discrimination was a motivating factor” seems to describe all
discrimination cases that reach a jury. After all, if there is insufficient
evidence to justify a jury finding that discrimination was even a motivat163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See 539 U.S. at 92, 101 n.3.
166 Id. at 101 n.3.
167 See id. at 94.
168 See id. at 98–99.
169 See id. at 100–01.
170 See id. at 101.
171 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100.
172 Id. at 101.
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ing factor, then the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.173
Concededly, the Desert Palace Court appears to have viewed the description “mixed-motive” as providing a possible boundary for its ruling; it stated in a footnote that “[t]his case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 [the portion of the 1991 Act that enacted
§§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)] applies outside of the mixedmotive context.”174 Desert Palace, therefore, eliminated one sort of linedrawing (direct versus circumstantial evidence) but left another: mixedmotive versus single-motive.175 As commentators have noted, nearly all
discrimination cases could be characterized as mixed-motive cases.176
Thus, for example, Michael Zimmer predicted soon after Desert Palace
“that a new, uniform proof structure will evolve from Desert Palace and
that the approach established in [§ 2000e-2(m)] will apply to almost all
individual discrimination cases.”177 Henry Chambers has suggested that

173 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. Rev. 83, 100 (2004) (“Because allowing a motivating factor
showing to be made purely through circumstantial evidence makes the showing easier to
make than (or identical to) a pretext showing, a motivating factor instruction would appear to be appropriate in every pretext case that survives summary judgment.”).
174 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n.1.
175 See id. Although both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used under Desert Palace, courts continue to maintain other boundaries, ruling that some evidence is not closely
enough linked to the challenged action to show a discriminatory motivation. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The required causal link renders
stray remarks, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers that are
unrelated to the decisional process insufficient to require a mixed-motive analysis.”).
176 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
Ala. L. Rev. 741, 764 (2005) (“There is no logical way to separate cases involving mixed
motives from cases in which a plaintiff claims that only a single, illegitimate factor motivated the decision without imposing obligations not contemplated by the statute or basic
rules of civil procedure.”); Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1928 (“Even if courts try to maintain
a distinction between ‘single-motive’ cases where § 703(m) does not apply and ‘mixedmotive’ cases where it does, every McDonnell Douglas case turns, at least potentially, into a
‘mixed-motive’ case once the defendant asserts a nondiscriminatory reason.”).
177 Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1891; see also Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733,
747 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, D.J., concurring specially) (“There is simply no need to
retain the McDonnell Douglas paradigm when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 effectively allows a
court to analyze the evidence to determine if discrimination was a motivating factor in the
employment decision.”); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and Desert Palace, 41
Hous. L. Rev. 1549, 1568–69 (2005) (“McDonnell Douglas’s standard of causation . . . is
higher or more rigorous (harder for a plaintiff to satisfy) than section 703(m)’s motivating
factor standard. After Desert Palace, a plaintiff cannot be required to satisfy the higher standard of the pretext analysis.”).
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Desert Palace increases trial judges’ discretion concerning when to give a
motivating-factor instruction.178
Courts have not been eager to conclude that Desert Palace assimilated all Title VII discrimination claims to the § 2000e-2(m) structure. 179 A number of courts have noted the questions Desert Palace
raised but have avoided the need to discern the reach of the motivating-factor framework by concluding that the choice between a burdenshifting and a burden-retaining proof structure did not affect the case
before them.180 In the wake of Desert Palace, courts have also confronted
the question of whether a mixed-motive plaintiff who proffers no direct
178 See Chambers, supra note 173, at 102 (“[T]he Court is unlikely to develop a specific
test to tell trial judges when sufficient evidence has been presented to trigger a motivating
factor instruction. Rather, it will likely leave the evidentiary analysis (and the discretion
that accompanies it) to trial judges.”).
179 See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 319 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2005) (agreeing with courts that “rejected the view that Desert Palace nullified the
McDonnell Douglas framework”); Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[A]fter Desert Palace was decided, this Court has continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas
analysis in non-mixed-motive cases.”), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006). The Fifth Circuit “has adopted . . . a ‘modified McDonnell Douglas approach’” that offers mixed-motive analysis as an alternative to pretext analysis. Keelan
v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 341 (5th Cir. 2005). Under this modified approach:
After the plaintiff has met his four-element prima facie case and the defendant
has responded with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action[,]” the plaintiff must offer evidence “either (1) that the
defendant’s reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination
(pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant’s reason, while true, is only
one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic. (mixed-motive[s] alternative).
Id. (quoting Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Some courts have asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s post-Desert Palace decision in
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003), demonstrates that the Court contemplates the
continued use of the McDonnell Douglas framework even after Desert Palace. See, e.g., White v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp. 533 F.3d 381, 400 n.10 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[P]ost-Desert Palace, the
Supreme Court has continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis to summary
judgment challenges in single-motive Title VII cases.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2009).
Raytheon, however, concerned an ADA claim and did not discuss § 2000e-2(m). See 540 U.S.
at 46.
180 So, for example, the First Circuit recently noted that Desert Palace and McDonnell
Douglas “have not been definitively disentangled or reconciled.” Chadwick v. WellPoint,
Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 n.8 (1st Cir. 2009). The Chadwick court, however, declined to attempt
such a reconciliation because it concluded that the plaintiff had in any event presented
evidence that would justify a jury in finding “that the promotion denial was more probably
than not caused by discrimination.” Id. at 48; see also Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F.
App’x 707, 718 n.11, 2008 WL 5328466 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (“We
doubt that the Costa Court modified [the McDonnell Douglas] framework because the Court
did not address or cite McDonnell Douglas in that opinion; however, we need not resolve
that issue here.”).
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evidence of discriminatory motive is subject to the McDonnell Douglas
framework at the summary judgment stage.181 That question, however,
lies beyond the scope of this Article.182
In any event, Desert Palace failed to resolve the question of how to
delineate the application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting in cases not
covered by the statutory burden-shifting framework.183 That, of course,
was the question on which certiorari was granted in Gross—and which
the Gross Court avoided by holding Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
categorically inapplicable in ADEA cases.184
It seems possible that the decision in Gross was driven by the view
that Desert Palace lacks any limiting principle. In this regard, it is suggestive that both Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg questioned the mixedmotive/non-mixed motive dichotomy during the oral argument in

181 See, e.g., White, 533 F.3d at 400 (reviewing cases and holding that “the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework does not apply to the summary judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims”); see also Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735 (“Desert Palace, a
decision in which the Supreme Court decided only a mixed motive jury instruction issue,
is an inherently unreliable basis for district courts to begin ignoring this Circuit’s controlling summary judgment precedents.”).
182 Although this question lies beyond the scope of the Article, it seems clear that a
mixed-motive plaintiff should not be required to demonstrate that the defendant’s stated
reason for the challenged employment action was pretextual. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework
to commence its analysis of a mixed-motive claim, but emphasizing that mixed-motive
plaintiffs are not required to show pretext in order to avoid summary judgment). Moreover, Judge Karen Nelson Moore has argued persuasively that “the purpose of the prima
facie case” under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework
is to rule out the most likely legitimate reasons for an adverse employment
decision. An employee can succeed on a mixed-motive claim, however, even if
such legitimate reasons played a role in the decision, so long as an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor. Therefore, a different approach is necessary for analyzing mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage.
Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
183 See, e.g., Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1225 n.5, 1226 (10th Cir. 2008)
(declining to decide whether § 2000e-2(m) applies to Title VII retaliation claims, but
nonetheless holding that the plaintiff could “use circumstantial evidence to establish directly that retaliatory animus played a motivating part in the [Oklahoma Corporation
Commission’s] decision to terminate her”); see also B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 Tul. L.
Rev. 439, 464 (2008) (“For retaliation claims arising under section 704[,] . . . the 1991
amendments are inapplicable and the distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence cases apparently remains an open question.”).
184 The dissenters, by contrast, would have held Price Waterhouse burden-shifting applicable and would have held that no direct evidence requirement circumscribes the availability of such burden-shifting. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Gross.185 And they were right to question that dichotomy. As a number
of commentators have suggested, the concept of mixed motives provides an apt description of many instances of discrimination.186 In any
case in which the evidence would entitle the jury to find both that the
employer was motivated by a legitimate reason and that the employer
was also motivated by bias, it seems fair to argue that the term “mixed
motive” is apt.187 The “direct evidence,” “animus,” and “animus plus”
tests all restrained the use of burden-shifting to a subset of these cases;
but no such limitation seems justified under Desert Palace.
The lack of a limiting principle does not in itself counsel against
adopting the Desert Palace approach. Indeed, one might argue that Desert Palace parallels the course taken by five justices in Price Waterhouse,
given that neither the Price Waterhouse plurality nor Justice White imposed any “direct evidence” requirement for the application of the
burden-shifting framework. But neither those five justices in Price
Waterhouse, nor the Court in Desert Palace, nor the dissenters in Gross explained how a district court should proceed to choose between the
burden-retaining (“determinative factor”) instruction and the burdenshifting (“motivating factor”) instruction in a given case.
William Corbett has argued that under Desert Palace the burdenretaining instruction should no longer be available; in his view, the
court should always give a mixed-motive burden-shifting instruction.188
A number of courts, however, have rejected this view, reasoning that the
plaintiff should have the option of proceeding under a burden-

185 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 107, at *19 ( Justice Alito: “Do you think
that there is a tenable distinction between a mixed motives case and a non-mixed motives
case? In every employment discrimination case that gets beyond summary judgment,
aren’t there mixed motives at play?”); id. at *20 ( Justice Ginsburg: “Couldn’t—couldn’t
any Title VII case be presented in either framework?”).
186 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 176, at 764; Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1928.
187 The Ninth Circuit, in Desert Palace itself, concluded that “the choice of jury instructions depends simply on a determination of whether the evidence supports a finding that
just one—or more than one—factor actually motivated the challenged decision.” Costa v.
Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003);
see also Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Since it is uncontroverted that Marathon has offered two reasons for firing Stegall, yet we hold that the
record in this case would support a finding that Marathon had illegitimate motives, it is
logical to examine the case as one involving ‘mixed motives.’”).
188 Corbett, supra note 177, at 1572–73. (“If one accepts my argument . . . that after
Desert Palace the standard of causation for all intentional discrimination cases is the motivating factor standard, then the idea that a plaintiff could request a jury instruction on a
higher standard should not even be entertained.”).
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retaining framework.189 But when might the plaintiff wish to do so? If
the burden-retaining and burden-shifting instructions are compared
strictly as a matter of logic, plaintiffs ought to always prefer the mixedmotive burden-shifting instruction and defendants ought to always prefer the burden-retaining instruction.190
It seems fair to assume that defendants will ordinarily follow this
logic.191 There is evidence to suggest, however, that plaintiffs may not
always do so.192 Zimmer asserts that “historically Price Waterhouse ‘mixedmotive’ cases have been treated as somewhat of a ‘third rail’ issue by
defendants as well as plaintiffs.”193 Assessing the extent to which litigants are likely to try to use Title VII’s statutory burden-shifting framework, Zimmer suggests that lawyers who lack experience with the use of
a burden-shifting framework may prefer a burden-retaining instruction
189 See, e.g., Sosa v. Napolitano, 318 F. App’x. 68, 72 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (stating in dicta that “a plaintiff who has circumstantial evidence of discrimination
may choose to proceed under either the mixed-motive theory or the burden shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas,” but holding that the plaintiff’s proof failed under either
theory); White, 533 F.3d at 390 n.4 (“White has presented his failure to promote claim as a
single-motive discrimination claim brought pursuant only to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Thus, we do not analyze his claim under the unique mixed-motive summary judgment
analysis that is appropriate for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).”);
Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting contention that § 2000e2(m) provides the sole route for establishing liability because, if so, “an option previously
open to plaintiffs would be foreclosed without the Congress having spoken to the issue”);
Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In responding to a summary judgment motion in a Title VII disparate treatment case, a plaintiff may
produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason
more likely than not motivated the defendant’s decision, or alternatively may establish a
prima facie case under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.”).
190 Cf. Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 503, 524
(2008) (“If both options are available to plaintiffs, most—if not all—plaintiffs would likely
choose the mixed motive theory.”).
191 Defendants—who already should logically prefer a burden-retaining instruction—
may additionally fear that articulating any burden-shifting scheme might confuse the jury
into thinking that the defendant bears the burden of proof on other issues as well. See
Brill, supra note 80, at 22 (“Often, neither party will request the ‘same decision’ instruction. The defendant may not want it because it shifts the burden of proof to the defendant
and it may be confusing.”); Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1942 (“[D]efendants do not relish
the prospect of ever carrying the burden of persuasion on any issue in a discrimination
case.”). Judge Brill (a federal magistrate judge) also suggests that if the jury believes that
the plaintiff has proven that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment
decision, it is unlikely that the defendant will be able to convince the jury that it would
have made the same decision anyway. See Brill, supra note 80, at 18–19; see also George
Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of Proof: Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of
Employment Discrimination, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 43, 68 (1993).
192 See Zimmer, supra note 106, 1935–48.
193 Id. at 1942.
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because the latter is familiar to them.194 Moreover, plaintiffs litigating a
Title VII case may “fear the same-decision defense will tempt the jury to
‘split the baby,’ finding liability under § [2000e-2(m)]’s ‘a motivating
factor’ standard, but then finding that the defendant proved its samedecision defense—thereby depriving plaintiff of the most important
remedies.”195
It is possible, then, to conclude that under Desert Palace many (or
most) Title VII discrimination claims could logically be tried under either a “determinative factor” instruction or a “motivating factor” instruction. When and how should the district court make the choice? At
a minimum, the choice should be made before closing arguments and
the final jury instructions. It is interesting to note that the confusion
over the applicability of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting has been so
severe in some instances that the trial court was unable to make the
choice even at that point. Accordingly, the committee that drafted
model instructions for use in civil cases in the Eighth Circuit has suggested that if a district judge is uncertain whether a case warrants a
burden-shifting or a burden-retaining instruction, the judge should
direct the jury to fill out a special verdict form that combines the two
frameworks.196 The form first asks whether the plaintiff has proven butfor causation.197 If the answer is yes, then the jury proceeds to assess
damages; if the answer is no, then the form inquires whether the plaintiff has proven that the plaintiff’s protected status was a motivating factor.198 If the answer is no, then the jury is done; if the answer is yes,
then the form asks whether the defendant has proven that it would
have made the same decision anyway.199 If the answer is yes, then the
jury is done; if the answer is no, then the jury proceeds to assess damages.200
The Eighth Circuit suggests this approach only when the trial
court is uncertain of the appropriate instruction to give.201 These writ194 Id. (“Given that the vast majority of individual discrimination cases have been
treated as McDonnell Douglas cases, both defendants and plaintiffs may be reluctant to use
the mixed-motive analysis because they share the feeling that the known devil of McDonnell
Douglas is better than the unknown devil of § 703(m).”).
195 Id.
196 See 8th Cir. Civil Jury Instr. § 5.92 (2008).
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id.; see also Hartley v. Dillard’s, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a challenge to a district court’s use of the special verdict form and noting that “[t]his
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ten questions can help to avoid the risk that a new trial will be required
if an appellate court disagrees with the trial court’s judgment over
which instruction to give. They constitute an ingenious solution to the
problem of doctrinal uncertainty. But they are not an optimal solution,
because it is difficult to see how one should explain to the jury the
purpose of these alternative questions. Ideally, the trial court should be
put in a position to choose between the burden-retaining and the burden-shifting instruction so as to give only one of those instructions to
the jury.
Moreover, that choice should ideally be made before the start of
the trial (rather than after the close of the evidence). The parties should
be permitted to tailor their opening statements and their presentation
of evidence to the burden framework on which the jury will be instructed. Additionally, it is generally useful for the court to give the jury
some simple preliminary instructions concerning the law that governs
the claims—a task that will be more straightforward if the burden
framework has been determined in advance.
This does not mean that either party should be obliged to adduce
their views of the applicable burden framework at the outset of the litigation.202 For one thing, if there do exist some cases in which the evidence could only support a choice between two competing visions of
the motive for the challenged action—and the evidence would not
permit a jury to conclude that both motives coexisted—it will ordinarily
be impossible to discern the applicability of a mixed-motives instruction until after discovery.203 Thus, it should be open to the plaintiff to
see how the evidence evolves through discovery before taking a position on whether to request a burden-shifting rather than a burdenretaining instruction. Likewise, although various justices and commentators have referred to the same-decision defense as an “affirmative defense,” this categorization should not be taken to indicate that the dejury instruction was designed for use when a case cannot easily be classified as either a
mixed motive case or a pretext case”).
202 See, e.g., Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1041 n.7 (“A plaintiff need not decide at the
outset of the case whether she wishes to pursue a single motive or a mixed-motives theory
of discrimination.”); Diamond, 416 F.3d at 317 n.3 (“Whether Diamond pled a mixedmotive claim is irrelevant, however, because ‘a case need not be characterized or labeled at
the outset. Rather, the shape will often emerge after discovery or even at trial. Similarly,
the complaint itself need not contain more than the allegation that the adverse employment action was taken because of a protected characteristic.’”) (quoting Costa, 299 F.3d at
856 n.7).
203 See Stegall, 350 F.3d at 1071 (“[I]t is common to have an employer’s reasons for terminating an employee fleshed out during the course of litigation.”).
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fendant risks waiver of the defense by failing to raise it in its answer.204
The term “affirmative defense,” here, is best read as shorthand for the
view that the burden of proof should rest on the defendant because the
defendant is best equipped to marshal the relevant evidence.205 Accordingly, the best approach would seem to be that the parties should
brief the question of burdens in their pretrial submissions and the trial
court should designate the applicable burden framework in the final
pretrial order. If the plaintiff requests, and the court agrees to give, a
“motivating factor” instruction under Price Waterhouse, then the defendant should be allowed to choose whether or not to request a “same
decision” instruction.206
The approach outlined above is far from the only possible way to
settle the question of when and how the burden choice should be
made. But it is consistent with the logic of Desert Palace, and it provides a
structured and predictable framework for the application of that case’s
guidance.207 Objections might be leveled at this approach; for example,
204 It is, however, advisable to require the defendant to request a same-decision instruction in its pretrial submissions, so that the plaintiff is alerted to the defendant’s intention
to frame its defense in this way. But see Fogg, 492 F.3d at 459 (Henderson, J., concurring)
(arguing that the § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) same-decision defense goes only to remedies and
thus “need not be raised until the remedy stage of the proceedings”).
205 See Brill, supra note 80, at 24 (discussing possible views concerning when defendant
should raise the same-decision defense).
206 For a case in which the defendant’s choice not to request a same-decision instruction resulted in a defense verdict, see Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1020, 1021 (9th
Cir. 2005). In Galdamez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s
contention that “the district court failed to give a mixed motive instruction” where the
court in fact did give a motivating-factor instruction but did not instruct the jury on the
same-decision defense because the defendant did not request such an instruction. Id. If
there is no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the defendant would have
made the same decision absent the discriminatory motive, then the court should not instruct on the same-decision defense. See Brill, supra note 80, at 25. As to complexities that
may arise in cases that involve statutory burden-shifting, see infra note 207.
207 For claims, such as Title VII claims, to which the statutory same-decision defense
applies, the question of jury instructions on the same-decision defense is somewhat more
complicated than it is for cases in which the Price Waterhouse same-decision defense applies.
In Price Waterhouse cases, the defendant’s decision not to request a same-decision instruction should clearly be dispositive: if the defendant does not wish the jury to receive that
instruction, the defendant will have no further opportunity to raise the same-decision defense after a jury verdict for the plaintiff. But what if, in a case covered by § 2000e5(g)(2)(B), the defendant fails to request a same-decision instruction, the jury finds for
the plaintiff under the motivating-factor instruction, and the defendant later argues to the
court that reinstatement is inappropriate under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) because the defendant can “demonstrate” that it would have fired the plaintiff anyway for a nondiscriminatory reason? For a case holding that the district court was free to find facts concerning the
same-decision argument where the defendant had requested, and the plaintiff had successfully opposed, a same-decision jury instruction, see Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 21
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one might question whether plaintiffs should have the option of choosing between the two frameworks. As noted above, Professor Corbett
argues that all Title VII discrimination claims should now be litigated as
mixed motive cases.208 The salient point for current purposes, however,
is that either the approach this Article suggests or Professor Corbett’s
approach could be readily administered. Thus, although Gross did remove any confusion over when to give a burden-shifting instruction in
ADEA cases, outlawing the use of burden-shifting in such cases was not
the only option for addressing confusion over the applicability of burden-shifting. Moreover, a decision to hold burden-shifting categorically
inapplicable to ADEA (or other) claims has the potential to increase a
different sort of confusion—that which arises when a jury confronts
multiple claims that carry varying burdens of proof.
3. The Possible Impact of Gross on Other Types of Employment Claims
The holding in Gross covers only ADEA discrimination claims.209
But how does the Gross majority’s reasoning affect the availability of
burden-shifting instructions as to other causes of action? The Gross majority did not say.210 A preliminary cut at the question might ask to what
extent the rationales discussed in Part I.A. apply to each type of claim.
Such an analysis is only a rough cut, of course, because in each instance
there may be other factors that might make the parallel with the ADEA
claims addressed in Gross either stronger or weaker. But at least the factors discussed in Gross provide a starting point. One might chart the
potential application of the Gross rationales to other claims as shown in
the following table.211 The rationales discussed in Parts I.A.1 through
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Even if the court were to assume that the 1991 Act reserves the ‘same
action’ defense under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) for the jury, Porter waived any right to a jury
instruction on that defense when he objected to USAID’s request for that instruction and
agreed instead to an instruction that asked the jury only to determine liability based on a
finding of discrimination or retaliation as ‘a motivating factor.’”). In any event, though this
issue may be challenging, it arises only under the statutory burden-shifting framework.
Therefore, it is not directly germane to my argument here, because my focus is on the
administrability of the Price-Waterhouse burden-shifting framework, where this particular
challenge does not arise.
208 See Corbett, supra note 177, at 1572–73.
209 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346.
210 See id.
211 The table shows selected claims rather than attempting to list all the possible claims
that might be affected by Gross. For a sense of the relative frequency of some of the listed
types of claims, see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 103, 117 display 6
(2009). Clermont and Schwab list the frequency of selected types of cases in federal court
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I.A.4. are listed in the top row, but they are re-ordered to reflect the
potential breadth of their applicability to other types of claims.
The ’91 Act
Rejection of Price
Statutory
The ’91 Act
burden-shifting Waterhouse removes
language
framework
framework does Supreme Court particular to the
forecloses
not apply
authority for
claim forecloses burden-shifting
burden-shifting burden-shifting
Title VII retaliation
claims
ADEA retaliation
claims
Equal Pay Act
retaliation claims
FLSA retaliation
claims
FMLA retaliation
claims
FMLA claims

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

?

✔

✔

✔

?

✔

✔

✔

?

✔

✔

(✔ )

?

(✔ )

✔

✔

?

(✔ )

✔

(✔ )

?

§ 1981 claims

✔

✔

✘

?

§ 1981 retaliation
claims
§ 1983
discrimination claims
§ 1983 1st Am.
retaliation claims

✔

✔

✘

?

✔

✘

✘

✘

✔

✘

✘

✘

ADA retaliation
claims
ADA claims

a. Inapplicability of Statutory Burden-Shifting
One can see that for almost all of the claims listed in the above
chart the Court would likely conclude (as it did in Gross) that Title VII’s
statutory burden-shifting scheme is inapplicable, because neither text
nor legislative history provides stronger support than it did in Gross for
the application of §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). For example,
Title VII’s statutory burden-shifting scheme does not refer explicitly to
Title VII retaliation claims: section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) refers to “a claim
in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m),”
and § 2000e-2(m) refers to a showing “that race, color, religion, sex, or
from 1998–2006 as 64,122 Title VII cases, 8240 ADA cases, 8342 § 1983 cases, 7105 ADEA
cases, 4457 § 1981 cases, and 1503 FMLA cases. Id.
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national origin was a motivating factor” in an employment practice.212
Because § 2000e-2(m)’s list of invidious motives does not include retaliation, a number of courts have concluded that the statutory burdenshifting scheme is inapplicable to Title VII retaliation claims.213 ADEA
retaliation claims, like ADEA discrimination claims, invoke a remedial
scheme that is distinct from Title VII’s; thus, §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e5(g)(2)(B) are inapplicable to ADEA retaliation claims.214
The only claims in this chart for which a contrary view might be
taken are claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)—
but even there, such a view would not be likely to persuade the Supreme Court. To understand the effect of the 1991 Act on the ADA, a
brief outline of the connections between the ADA and Title VII is helpful. Congress enacted the ADA in July 1990—after the Court’s 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse but before the passage of the 1991 Act.215
Then as now, the ADA included the following enforcement provision:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections
2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title
shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter
provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to
any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning employment.216
At the time, § 2000e-5 said nothing about motivating-factor analysis;
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) would not be added until 1991.217 Thus, to the ex212 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m), e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
213 See, e.g., Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999)
(“[Section] 107(a) of Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not expressly roll back Price Waterhouse’s
application to retaliation claims.”); McNutt v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 709
(7th Cir. 1998) (“Congress clearly stated its decision to overrule Price Waterhouse only with
respect to claims under § 2000e-2(m) and did not make a similar provision for retaliation
claims under § 2000e-3(a).”); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 935 (3d Cir.
1997) (“[Section] 107 does not apply to retaliation cases.”); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d
680, 684 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[T]he mixed motive provisions of section 107 of the 1991 Act do
not apply to Title VII retaliation claims brought under section 2000e-3.”). But see Fye, 516
F.3d at 1225 n.5 (“[W]e have yet to decide whether [§ 2000e-2(m)] actually appl[ies] to
retaliation cases, and we decline to do so today because we conclude that Ms. Fye has not
presented evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment.”).
214 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c) (West 2008 & Supp. 2009).
215 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
216 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006).
217 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 107, § 706(g)(2)(B), 105 Stat.
1071 (1991).
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tent that the 1990 Congress intended the ADA’s enforcement scheme
to mirror that in Title VII, one might argue that the relevant framework
for mixed-motive cases would have been that set by Price Waterhouse, under which the same-decision affirmative defense, if established, would
preclude liability altogether.218
As noted above, the 1991 Act addressed Price Waterhouse by amending § 2000e-2 to add, inter alia, subsection 2000e-2(m), which provides:
“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.”219 Did this amendment directly affect the ADA? No statutory provision explicitly incorporates Section 2000e-2’s standards into the
ADA. The 1991 Act, however, also altered § 2000e-5 to add § 2000e5(g)(2)(B):
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates
that the respondent would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court—(i)
may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim
under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award
damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).220
It is unclear how § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) affects ADA claims.221 Because an ADA violation would not constitute “a violation under section
2000e-2(m) of this title,” one could argue that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
218 See Flynn, supra note 50, at 2035–36 (“The 100th Congress introduced the first ADA
bill, Senate Bill 2345, on April 28, 1988—six months before Price Waterhouse was argued
. . . . The 101st Congress, which would eventually enact the ADA, forged the ADA in a
legislative crucible in which Price Waterhouse was explicitly an element. Consideration of the
ADA began on May 9, 1989—eight days after the Supreme Court handed down Price Waterhouse . . . .”).
219 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
220 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
221 See Flynn, supra note 50, at 2044 (arguing that “[i]t would be odd . . . to impute to
a provision designed to limit remedies the power to create new substantive liability under
the ADA”). But see Belk v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating
that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) applies to ADA claims); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,
470 (4th Cir. 1999) (indicating that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) applies to ADA claims).
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simply does not apply to ADA claims. That argument gains some force
from the fact that the 1991 Act made a number of changes to the ADA
without explicitly inserting into the ADA a provision similar to § 2000e2(m) and without including ADA claims on the list of claims in
§ 2000e-2(m) itself.222 On the other hand, a strong argument can be
made that legislators would have understood the new § 2000e5(g)(2)(B) to be among the “powers, remedies and procedures” available under the ADA. Consider the following passage from a 1991
House Report on a prior version of the legislation:
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS MODELED
AFTER TITLE VII
A number of other laws banning discrimination, including
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. S
12101 et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. S 621, et seq., are modeled after, and have
been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII.
The Committee intends that these other laws modeled after
Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent
with Title VII as amended by this Act. For example, disparate
impact claims under the ADA should be treated in the same
manner as under Title VII. Thus, under the ADA, once a
plaintiff makes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate business
necessity, using the same standards as under Title VII. This
was the clear intent of the Committee during its consideration
of the ADA.
Similarly, mixed motive cases involving disability under the ADA
should be interpreted consistent with the prohibition against all intentional discrimination in Section 5 of this Act.
Certain sections of Title VII are explicitly cross-referenced
in Subsection 107(a) of the ADA, to ensure that persons with
disabilities have the same powers, remedies and procedures as
under Title VII. This would include having the same remedies
and statute of limitations as Title VII, as amended by this Act,
and by any future amendment. This issue was specifically addressed by the Committee during its consideration of the
ADA.223
222 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 107.
223 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 4 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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In the version of the legislation this House Report describes, it was Section 5 of the Act that addressed Price Waterhouse.224 Thus, the House
Report’s discussion of ADA mixed-motive claims indicates an expectation that a new statutory burden-shifting scheme would displace Price
Waterhouse for ADA claims as well as Title VII claims.225
The Gross court, however, was aware of this passage in the House
Report—which specifically mentions ADEA claims—and yet did not
find it persuasive in determining whether to assimilate ADEA claims to
Title VII’s statutory mixed-motive framework. Justice Stevens’ dissent
specifically discusses this passage of the House Report and notes that it
provides “some evidence that Congress intended the 1991 mixedmotives amendments to apply to the ADEA as well.”226 Nonetheless,
Justice Stevens concludes that it is “reasonabl[e]” to hold that the statutory burden-shifting structure does not apply to ADEA claims.227
One might attempt to distinguish ADA claims from ADEA claims
in two ways. First, one might note that the House Report specifically
mentions ADA mixed-motive claims.228 Second, the ADA incorporates
the provisions of § 2000e-5 whereas the ADEA does not.229 It is unclear,
however, that these arguments would suffice to establish (after Gross)
that the statutory burden-shifting mechanism applies to ADA claims.
b. Rejecting Price Waterhouse Removes Authority for Burden-Shifting
With respect to many of the claims listed in the chart, it will be
possible to argue that the Court’s rejection of Price Waterhouse removes
any decisional support for burden-shifting. Section 1983 claims for First
Amendment retaliation or for employment discrimination, however,
will be unaffected by this rationale. Section 1983 provides a cause of
action to persons claiming that one acting under color of state law vio-

224 As the House Report explained:
Section 5 of the Act responds to Price Waterhouse by reaffirming that any reliance on prejudice in making employment decisions is illegal. At the same
time, the Act makes clear that, in considering the appropriate relief for such
discrimination, a court shall not order the hiring, retention or promoting of a
person not qualified for the position.
Id. at 2–3.
225 See id. at 4.
226 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227 Id.
228 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 4 (1991).
229 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006).
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lated their constitutional rights.230 This Article focuses on equal protection discrimination claims and First Amendment retaliation claims, because those two types of claims are of central relevance in employment
discrimination litigation under § 1983.
In contrast to all other claims discussed in this Part, the § 1983
claims discussed here in fact implicate U.S. Supreme Court holdings
that direct burden-shifting in mixed-motive cases. Indeed, Price Waterhouse itself was modeled largely on the burden-shifting scheme set forth
by the Supreme Court for First Amendment retaliation cases in Mt.
Healthy.231 Doyle, a teacher, claimed that the school board’s failure to
renew his contract constituted retaliation for his exercise of First
Amendment rights.232 Specifically, Doyle had called a local radio station
to criticize a memorandum from the principal setting a dress code for
teachers, and the radio station then discussed this dress code on the
air. 233 When the school board subsequently decided not to rehire
Doyle, he asked for a statement of reasons.234 The ensuing response
stated that Doyle displayed “a notable lack of tact in handling professional matters” and cited two examples: the call to the radio station and
an incident in which Doyle “used obscene gestures to correct students
in a situation in the cafeteria.”235
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below (which had ordered Doyle’s reinstatement with back pay). As the unanimous Court
explained:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a “substantial factor” —or to
put it in other words, that it was a “motivating factor” in the
Board’s decision not to rehire him. Respondent having carried that burden, however, the District Court should have
gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision as to respondent’s reemployment even in the
absence of the protected conduct.236

230 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009).
231 See 429 U.S. at 287.
232 Id. at 276.
233 Id. at 282.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 282–83 & n.1.
236 Id. at 287 (citation omitted).
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The Court reasoned that this same-decision affirmative defense was
necessary in order to avoid granting a windfall to the plaintiff:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected
conduct played a part . . . in a decision not to rehire, could
place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have
occupied had he done nothing.237
The Court further suggested that the defense was necessary in order to
prevent an employee who merited dismissal from manufacturing a reason to challenge such dismissal:
A borderline or marginal candidate . . . ought not to be able,
by engaging in [protected First Amendment] conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and
reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record,
simply because the protected conduct makes the employer
more certain of the correctness of its decision.238
Some two decades later, the Court applied the Mt. Healthy burdenshifting scheme to a race discrimination challenge to a school’s admission practices.239 The plaintiff in Texas v. Lesage challenged a university’s
use of race during the admissions process for a Ph.D. program.240 The
court of appeals rejected (as irrelevant to liability) the university’s contention that it would have denied Lesage admission even under a colorblind admissions process.241 The Supreme Court—in a unanimous
per curiam opinion—reversed, holding that the court of appeals’ view
was “inconsistent with this Court’s well-established framework”:
Under Mt. Healthy . . . even if the government has considered
an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the
plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating
that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration . . . . Our previous decisions on this point
have typically involved alleged retaliation for protected First
Amendment activity rather than racial discrimination, but
that distinction is immaterial. The underlying principle is the
237 429 U.S. at 285.
238 Id. at 286.
239 Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 19, 20–21 (1999) (per curiam).
240 Id. at 19.
241 See id. at 20.

2010]

Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions

323

same: The government can avoid liability by proving that it
would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive.242
Given Lesage’s sweeping language, it seems likely that its holding applies
to race discrimination claims concerning employment as well as those
concerning school admissions. The Lesage Court did limit its holding by
specifying that forward-looking claims for injunctive relief are not subject to the same-decision defense.243 But this limitation is not of concern here because claims for injunctive relief would not ordinarily be
tried to the jury, and because this Article focuses on whether burdenshifting instructions should be given to juries.
c. Statutory Language Governing the Claim Forecloses Burden-Shifting
As the chart indicates, a number of types of anti-retaliation claims
are grounded in statutes containing causation language that uses the
word “because.” Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any of his employees . . . because
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.”244 The ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision contains similar language,245 as does the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision.246
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)—which protects those bringing complaints under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) as well as those bringing complaints under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)—makes it unlawful “to dis242 Id. at 20–21. “Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983.” Id. at 21.
243 See id. at 21 (“Of course, a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were not considered. The relevant injury in such cases
is ‘the inability to compete on an equal footing.’”).
244 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
245 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (West 2008 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting an employer from discriminating against an employee “because such individual . . . has opposed any practice
made unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under
this chapter”).
246 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (“No person shall discriminate against any individual
because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or
because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”).
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charge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to
be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding . . . .”247 The Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) includes an anti-retaliation provision
featuring language similar to that in the FLSA.248 As to all of these
claims, the Gross Court’s reasoning concerning the term “because of” in
the ADEA would seem to apply with equal force.
Two types of claims—under the FMLA and the ADA—might not
be as clearly subject to the same reasoning, but the distinction is not a
strong one. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) makes it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA’s
leave provisions.249 It might be possible to argue that “for opposing”
could be read differently than “because.” It seems relatively unlikely,
however, that much would turn on the distinction between “for opposing” and “because.”
The ADA forbids discrimination “on the basis of” disability, and it
defines such discrimination to include, inter alia, “limiting, segregating,
or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects
the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of
the disability of such applicant or employee.”250 Does the ADA’s use of
the term “on the basis of” permit a broader reading than “because of”?
To interpret this provision, it is worth comparing its text to the text
of the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act provides in part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed247 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (2006).
248 The FMLA “entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave
annually for any of several reasons, including the onset of a ‘serious health condition’ in
an employee’s spouse, child, or parent.” Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
724 (2003). 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b) makes it “unlawful for any person to discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any individual because such individual” has, inter alia,
filed a charge or instituted a proceeding under the FMLA’s leave provisions. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(b) (2006).
249 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); see Richardson v. Monitronics Intern., Inc., 434 F.3d 327,
335 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding mixed motive analysis applicable to FMLA claim under
§ 2615(a)).
250 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(1) (West 2008).
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eral financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.251
The contrast between this language and that in the ADA suggests that
the ADA bars discrimination even if the adverse act is not motivated
solely by the disability. Thus, commentators have argued that the contrast in language between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act counsels
against applying the “solely by reason of” standard to the ADA.252 A
comparison between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act indicates that
an ADA plaintiff need not show that the disability was the sole cause of
the employer’s action. That comparison, however, does not establish
whether the plaintiff bears the burden of proving but-for causation.
Here, as in the ADEA, the statutory language includes the term “because of.” In short, although one might attempt to distinguish the language that grounds these FMLA and ADA claims from that analyzed in
Gross, it is not clear that the Court would find the distinction salient.
By contrast, the textual analysis differs dramatically with respect to
discrimination claims or retaliation claims brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.253 Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.254
Although § 1981 does not explicitly address retaliation for the assertion of these rights, the Supreme Court held in CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries that retaliation claims can be brought under § 1981.255 The
CBOCS Court reasoned as follows:

251 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
252 See, e.g., Seam Park, Curing Causation: Justifying a “Motivating-Factor” Standard Under
the ADA, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 257, 267 (2004) (quoting 29 U.S.C § 794 (2000)).
253 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
254 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). For a suggested interpretation of this statutory language, see
Judith Olans Brown et al., Treating Blacks as if They Were White: Problems of Definition and Proof
in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1975).
255 See 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008).
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(1) in 1969, Sullivan [v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969)] . . . recognized that [42 U.S.C.] § 1982 encompasses a
retaliation action; (2) this Court has long interpreted §§ 1981
and 1982 alike; (3) in 1989, Patterson [v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164 (1989)], without mention of retaliation, narrowed
§ 1981 by excluding from its scope conduct, namely postcontract-formation conduct, where retaliation would most
likely be found; but in 1991, Congress enacted legislation [the
1991 Act] that superseded Patterson and explicitly defined the
scope of § 1981 to include post-contract-formation conduct;
and (4) since 1991, the lower courts have uniformly interpreted § 1981 as encompassing retaliation actions.256
Section 1981 contains no terms similar to the ADEA’s “because of,” and
thus nothing in the text of § 1981 forecloses the application of a burden-shifting framework.257 The same is true for § 1983 claims: As the
Gross Court itself noted, such claims involve no statutory language that
would foreclose a burden-shifting approach.258
d. The Effect of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
Finally, when one considers the Gross Court’s suggestion that the
1991 Act forecloses the continued application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting, one finds only two claims to which that assertion seems
strongly applicable. (Of course, as noted above, this line of reasoning
seems implausible as to any claims, even those under the ADEA; but,
for the purpose of predicting Gross’s reach, it is necessary to take the
contention at face value.)
For Title VII retaliation claims, as for the ADEA claims Gross addressed, it seems relatively uncontroversial to conclude that §§ 2000e2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) do not apply. But, as Part I.A.4. discussed,
the Gross Court took that statutory argument a step further, maintain256 Id. at 1957–58.
257 See Joanna L. Grossman, Making a Federal Case Out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will Employment, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 329, 371 (2001) (“Although it seems clear that § 1981 plaintiffs may rely on a mixed-motive theory to prove discrimination, it is not clear whether the
pre- or post-1991 rules regarding liability and available remedies will be applied. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which changed the mixed-motive proof structure, did not explicitly
amend § 1981. Most circuits, therefore, continue to hold that a defendant who makes the
appropriate showing will be excused from both liability and damages.”) (citation omitted).
258 See 129 S. Ct. at 2352 n.6 (“[T]he constitutional cases such as Mt. Healthy have no
bearing on the correct interpretation of ADEA claims, which are governed by statutory
text.”).
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ing that by failing to encompass ADEA claims within the statutory burden-shifting framework, Congress also foreclosed the application of the
Price Waterhouse framework.259 Interestingly, when courts have held the
statutory burden-shifting framework inapplicable to Title VII retaliation
claims they have tended to conclude from that fact that the Price Waterhouse framework applies instead—which demonstrates that the Gross
Court’s contrary inference is hardly intuitive.260 But, if the Gross majority found this argument persuasive in the context of ADEA discrimination claims, it seems likely that would also find it so in the context of
Title VII retaliation claims. For similar reasons, the Gross Court’s contention that the 1991 Act’s statutory burden-shifting provision forecloses the application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to ADEA discrimination claims would seem to apply with equal force to ADEA retaliation claims.
For all the other claims the chart covers, however, the application
of this rationale seems more or less questionable. As noted in Part I.A.4,
the premise for the Gross Court’s contention that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting is foreclosed by the 1991 Act’s statutory burden-shifting
scheme was that the 1991 Act amended the ADEA without adding to
the ADEA a statutory burden-shifting framework similar to that in
§§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).261 That premise is inapplicable
to FLSA and EPA retaliation claims, because the 1991 Act left the FLSA
and the EPA untouched.262 Likewise, the 1991 Act neither amended
§ 1983 nor purported to affect the standards of proof for constitutional
claims.263
As to § 1981 claims, the absence of any language in the text of
§ 1981 that could be read to suggest but-for causation also rebuts the
contention that the 1991 Act itself forecloses burden-shifting for such
claims.264 In Gross, the majority viewed the ADEA’s “because of” language as clear evidence of a but-for causation standard.265 One can argue that the Gross majority’s interpretation of the 1991 Act’s effect on
the ADEA depends in part on the parallel between the “because of”
259 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
260 See, e.g., McNutt, 141 F.3d at 709 (concluding that statutory burden-shifting does not
apply to Title VII retaliation claims and noting that “[i]n order to prove a Title VII violation . . . based on retaliation, Price Waterhouse still requires plaintiffs to establish that the
alleged discrimination was the ‘but for’ cause of a disputed employment action”).
261 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
262 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
263 See id.
264 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
265 See 129 S. Ct. at 2350–51.
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language in the ADEA and the same “because of” language in Title
VII.266 That is to say, if the “because of” language so strongly denotes
but-for causation, then that would constitute a significant part of the
reason why—in the Gross Court’s view—it was necessary in amending
Title VII not only to add § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) but also to add § 2000e2(m). Seen in that light, the failure to add similar provisions to § 1981
does not evince a congressional aversion to burden-shifting—it indicates, if anything, the lack of a parallel textual issue with respect to
§ 1981.
Part I.B.3.a. noted that the legislative history of the 1991 Act suggests a view on the part of some legislators that a statutory burdenshifting mechanism should apply to ADA claims.267 That legislative history probably would not convince the Court to apply statutory burdenshifting to such claims. But the history does provide particular reason
to doubt the applicability of the Gross Court’s further contention concerning the 1991 Act—namely, that the Act provides a reason to foreclose the application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting as well. As discussed above, that argument seems weak even as to the ADEA. But as to
the ADA, the argument seems particularly dubious. If anything, the
House Report indicates that at least some legislators wanted to afford
plaintiffs a more favorable burden-shifting mechanism than that delineated in Price Waterhouse.268 Although those legislators may not have
succeeded in effecting that change in the text of the statute, it would be
odd to conclude that the statutory text in fact did the opposite—i.e.,
that it eliminated all burden-shifting for ADA claims (even the more
limited burden-shifting framework delineated in Price Waterhouse).
The argument that the 1991 Act’s burden-shifting framework forecloses Price Waterhouse burden-shifting plays out somewhat differently for
FMLA claims than it did in Gross with respect to ADEA claims. The
FMLA was not enacted until 1993.269 Prior versions, however, were introduced even before the Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.270 Indeed,
precursors of the relevant language— “for opposing” in § 2615(a)(2)
and “because” in § 2615(b)—can be found both in a bill that was under
consideration prior to the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse decision,
and in a bill that was under consideration between the time of that deci266 That language in Title VII is currently codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
267 See supra notes 212–229 and accompanying text.
268 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 4 (1991).
269 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-3 (1993).
270 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 18–19 (1993), 1993 WL 30779 (giving history of prior
versions).
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sion and the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.271 The relevant language, therefore, pre-dated the congressional debates (concerning Price
Waterhouse) that led to the enactment of the 1991 Act.272 What can be
inferred from Congress’s failure to include a statutory mixed-motive
burden-shifting mechanism in the FMLA? On the one hand, it might
still be argued that Congress knew how to do so and did not— suggesting an intent not to subject FMLA claims to the same sort of mechanism
set by §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). And, if the line of reasoning in Gross is applied (despite the weaknesses identified above in Part
I.A.4), one might even argue that such a congressional choice indicates
a desire not to apply Price Waterhouse burden-shifting. On the other
hand, to the extent that the Gross majority’s inferences depended on the
fact that Congress amended the ADEA in the 1991 Act without inserting
a statutory burden-shifting mechanism, the FMLA would be distinguishable because it was not at issue in the 1991 Act.
Something more can be gleaned from the FMLA’s legislative history. A Senate report explains that § 2615(a)(2) is modeled on Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision and that § 2615(b) is modeled on the
FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.273 It might, therefore, be reasonable
to conclude that Congress intended to incorporate into those sections
whatever proof framework existed for the claims on which each provision was modeled. As to § 2615(b), that might lead to the conclusion
that the 1991 Act ought not to be taken to foreclose application of a
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting mechanism. As to § 2615(a)(2), the
opposite inference might be drawn from the analysis in Part I.A.1.
above concerning Title VII retaliation claims.
Where does this analysis take us? One can conclude that some
types of claims—most obviously, § 1983 claims—are unlikely to be affected by Gross. At the other extreme, certain claims—such as retaliation claims under the ADEA or Title VII—seem subject to the rationales applied by the Gross Court; as a result, courts may conclude that
burden-shifting is no longer available for such claims. Such an outcome
will be a significant change from prior law, given that at least five circuits previously viewed Title VII retaliation claims as eligible for bur-

271 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-511, pt. 2, § 107(a)(2), (b) (1988); S. Rep. No. 101-77, at
§ 107(a)(2), (b) (1989).
272 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-511, pt. 2, § 107(a)(2), (b); S. Rep. No. 101-77, at
§ 107(a)(2), (b).
273 See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 34, 35 (1993).
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den-shifting.274 The applicability of Gross is less clear for other types of
claims, with the result that courts may be uncertain as to the availability
of burden-shifting.275
There is, of course, the problem that a mechanical application of
the Gross rationales to other types of claims may be inappropriate, because in each instance there may be additional factors—not present in
Gross—that could change the analysis. The Gross Court’s repudiation of
Price Waterhouse, however, could affect almost all the claims discussed
here (although, unless the Court were also inclined to overrule Mt.
Healthy and Lesage, it would not affect § 1983 claims).
In sum, although Gross simplified the analysis of ADEA discrimination claims (by holding burden-shifting categorically inapplicable)
Gross cannot be said to have simplified the landscape of employment
discrimination generally. Gross will cause a period of uncertainty concerning the availability of burden-shifting for other types of claims.
What does seem clear is that, as the Gross dissenters noted, the decision
will increase the likelihood that when multiple claims are tried together, two different burden frameworks will apply.276
4. Confusion When Multiple Claims Are Subject to Different
Frameworks
Many employment discrimination cases involve more than one
type of claim.277 A plaintiff might allege a Title VII retaliation claim in
274 See, e.g., Fye, 516 F.3d at 1225 & n.5 (noting availability of mixed-motive framework
for Title VII retaliation claims, but declining to decide whether § 2000e-2(m) applies to
such claims); Speedy v. Rexnord Corp., 243 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Price
Waterhouse framework to a Title VII retaliation claim); Kubicko, 181 F.3d at 546 (same);
Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e analyze ADA
retaliation claims under the same framework we employ for retaliation claims arising under Title VII . . . . This framework will vary depending on whether the suit is characterized as a ‘pretext’ suit or a ‘mixed motives’ suit.”); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 685 (1st
Cir. 1996) (applying Price Waterhouse framework to a Title VII retaliation claim); see also
George, supra note 183 at 462–63 (“[T]he Price Waterhouse approach presumably remains
good law in considering retaliation cases . . . .”). But see Van Horn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.,
526 F.3d 1144, 1148 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Price Waterhouse standard does not apply to
retaliation claims.”).
275 For some of the claims discussed here, burden-shifting may not have been a widespread practice even before Gross. In particular, it appears that no court of appeals has
held Price Waterhouse burden-shifting applicable to EPA retaliation claims or FLSA retaliation claims.
276 See Katz, supra note 16, at 868 (discussing the “practical benefits” —including for
jury instructions—of an approach that treats claims under different statutes the same way).
277 This fact is evident in sources that list the percentage of employment discrimination cases that include various types of claims: when one sums the percentages, they
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addition to her Title VII discrimination claim. A race discrimination
plaintiff might sue under both Title VII and § 1981.278 A government
employee might bring a § 1983 claim as well as a Title VII claim or
§ 1981 claim.279 To the extent that different claims are subject to different burden-of-proof frameworks, a jury might be asked to decide
one claim under a burden-retaining instruction and another under a
burden-shifting instruction.
As an example, consider Title VII retaliation claims. Judging from
filings with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”),280 Title VII plaintiffs are bringing retaliation claims with increasing frequency: the percentage of EEOC filings that included Title
VII retaliation claims rose from roughly 20% in fiscal year 1997 to
roughly 30% in fiscal year 2008.281 It seems fair to infer both that lawamount to well over 100%. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 709,
715 tbl. 1 (1993) (reporting data from an American Bar Foundation survey of employment
civil rights cases filed in seven federal district courts from 1972 to 1987 and listing percentage of cases featuring, inter alia, Title VII claims (75.5%); § 1981 claims (33.1%); § 1983
claims (13.6%); and ADEA claims (10.3%)).
278 Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab “examined the courthouse record in
every § 1981 case filed in fiscal 1980–81 in the Central District of California, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern District of Georgia.” Theodore Eisenberg &
Stewart Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 596, 598 (1988). They
found
considerable but not complete overlap between title VII and section 1981. In
1980–81 in the three districts, plaintiffs filed 321 complaints of racial discrimination in employment. Two hundred seventy (84%) filed a title VII
claim. Of the title VII claims, almost one-half (133) also had a section 1981
claim.
Id. at 602–03 (citation omitted).
279 For example, in their study of § 1981 cases filed in fiscal 1980–81, Eisenberg and
Schwab found that of forty-one cases that involved claims under § 1981 but not Title VII,
“[e]leven of these cases were brought against government defendants and also relied on
section 1983.” Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 278, at 603.
280 EEOC charge filings are of course an indirect measure of the relative frequency of
various types of claims in lawsuits, because most charges filed with the EEOC do not result
in lawsuits. As a rough point of comparison, in fiscal year 2007 the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts reports that 13,375 “employment” civil rights suits were filed and 665 “accommodations” civil rights suits were filed. See 2007 Judicial Facts and Figures, at tbl. 4.4,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2007.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). The
EEOC reports that over 75,000 charges were filed with it in every fiscal year from 1997
through 2007. See U.S Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Charge Statistics FY 1997
Through FY 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last
visited Dec. 15, 2009).
281 See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2008, supra note 280. The absolute number of Title VII retaliation charges also rose, from 16,394 in fiscal year 1997 to 28,698 in
fiscal year 2008. Id.; see also George, supra note 183, at 441 (“Retaliation charges filed with
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suits involving retaliation claims are rising in frequency and that plaintiffs are combining discrimination and retaliation claims relatively often.282 For example, one study of reported opinions on racial harassment claims found that in almost half of the cases studied the plaintiff
also asserted a retaliation claim.283 In some subset of the cases that involve both discrimination and retaliation claims, both types of claims
will survive motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of
law and will be submitted to a jury.
How will the court instruct the jury in such cases? For the Title VII
discrimination claim, the statutory burden-shifting mechanism will be
potentially available. As noted in Part I.B.3.a., a number of courts will
treat the Title VII retaliation claim differently, holding that the statutory burden-shifting mechanism is unavailable.284 Nonetheless, prior to
Gross, it seemed clear that in some cases the Price Waterhouse burdenshifting mechanism would be available for the retaliation claim— although the availability of such burden-shifting might depend on the
uncertain doctrinal contours discussed above in Part I.B.2.285 In some
of these double-claim trials, the jury would receive relatively consistent
causation instructions on the two claims, in the sense that a motivatingfactor instruction would be provided on each claim. The nature of the
same-decision defense would, of course, differ as between the Title VII
discrimination claim, where the same-decision defense would go only
to remedies under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), and the Title VII retaliation
claim, where the same-decision defense would go to liability under Price
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the enforcement agency for
Title VII, have been steadily rising, doubling in the last fifteen years.”); Laura Beth Nielsen
& Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 663, 690 & fig. 1 (reviewing EEOC charge filing
data from 1992 to 2002 and observing that “[t]wo types of discrimination clearly rise in
prominence over the period: retaliation, which grows from 15.3% of individual complaints
to 27.5% of individual complaints, and disability”).
282 Nielsen and Nelson, noting the rise in retaliation claims during the period from
1992 to 2002, posit “an increasing tendency for plaintiffs (and their lawyers) to add retaliation as a claim in discrimination disputes” as one possible reason for the rise, but also list
other possible reasons and caution that they lack the data to draw a conclusion. Nielsen &
Nelson, supra note 281, at 690.
283 Pat Chew and Robert Kelley studied 260 opinions in racial-harassment cases from
six circuits during the years up to and including 2002. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley,
Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 49, 53–54 (2006). They
found that the plaintiffs in nearly half (49.2%) of the cases also asserted retaliation claims.
Id. at 80, tbl. 11. Although the study encompassed § 1981 claims and § 1983 claims as well
as Title VII claims, 87.7% of the cases involved Title VII claims. Id.
284 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 108–208 and accompanying text.
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Waterhouse. But at least the starting point—the motivating-factor instruction—would be parallel.
The analysis in Part I.B.3. provides some reason to wonder whether
courts will continue to apply Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to Title VII
retaliation claims, because all the rationales relied upon by the Gross
Court with respect to ADEA discrimination claims seem to apply with
equal force to Title VII retaliation claims.286 But before courts extend
Gross to Title VII retaliation claims, it would make sense for them to
consider whether such an extension truly serves the interests articulated by the Court in Gross.287 Although the Gross Court’s concern that
burden-shifting instructions are inherently confusing seems unsupported,288 it is worthwhile to consider the costs of confusion that will
arise from giving jurors a burden-shifting instruction on one claim
while giving them a burden-retaining instruction on the other. Such
contrasting instructions do seem potentially confusing, and it seems fair
to predict that they will be given more often if Gross is extended to Title
VII retaliation claims.289
Other permutations of the problem will arise. In some cases, a
plaintiff may assert a Title VII discrimination claim and an ADEA discrimination claim.290 After Gross, this pairing will predictably result in
contrasting causation instructions whenever the Title VII discrimination claim qualifies for the statutory burden-shifting mechanism.291 In
other cases, § 1981 claims may be paired with Title VII discrimination
claims or with § 1983 discrimination claims.292 As was previously noted,
286 See supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text.
287 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
288 See supra notes 79–107 and accompanying text.
289 I say “more often” advisedly, because even if the same approach were to apply to
both Title VII discrimination claims and Title VII retaliation claims, it would still be theoretically possible for a burden-shifting instruction to be given on one claim and a burdenretaining instruction to be given on the other. So long as the relevant scheme is one in
which not all cases qualify for a burden-shifting instruction, there may exist fact patterns
that justify a burden-shifting instruction for one claim but not for the other.
290 For rough evidence that this pairing sometimes occurs in actual litigation, I ran the
following search in the U.S. District Courts Cases (“DCT”) database on Westlaw: ASSERT!
/S “TITLE VII” /S ADEA. As of August 3, 2009, the search retrieved 865 documents.
291 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Were the Court truly worried
about difficulties faced by trial courts and juries, moreover, it would not reach today’s decision, which will further complicate every case in which a plaintiff raises both ADEA and
Title VII claims.”).
292 See Grossman, supra note 257, at 377–78 (describing her “review of all district court
decisions within the Second Circuit in 1999 and 2000, in which a § 1981 claim is raised”
and reporting that “[s]ixty-nine percent of the cases including a § 1981 claim also included a Title VII claim. Section 1981 claims were also coupled with § 1983 claims (31%),

334

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 51:279

Title VII discrimination claims are eligible for statutory burdenshifting.293 Section 1983 discrimination claims are eligible for burdenshifting instructions under Mt. Healthy, and as Part I.B.3 discussed,
there is no reason to think that Gross will change that.294 As Part I.B.3
also notes, two of the key rationales relied upon in Gross do not apply to
§ 1981 claims, and thus there is reason to doubt that Gross will be extended to such claims.295 From the perspective of jury comprehension,
that seems like a good thing in light of the overlap in some cases between § 1981 claims and either Title VII or § 1983 claims.
* * *
This Part noted that the Gross Court adduced four rationales in
support of its conclusion that burden-shifting on causation is impermissible under the ADEA. By revisiting those rationales briefly, one can see
that three of them support the result in Gross only if one accepts the
view that the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting approach has been discredited. Take first the Court’s argument that the ADEA’s language
forecloses burden-shifting; Price Waterhouse addressed materially similar
language in Title VII and reached the opposite conclusion. Next, take
the Court’s conclusion that the statutory burden-shifting mechanism
does not apply to ADEA cases; although reasonable, this argument does
not in itself foreclose the application of the non-statutory Price Waterhouse burden-shifting. Admittedly, one rationale in Gross stands independent of the merits of Price Waterhouse: If the Gross Court were correct
that the 1991 Act itself forecloses the continued application of Price
Waterhouse burden-shifting for claims other than Title VII discrimination claims, that conclusion would support the result in Gross even if
Price Waterhouse were not otherwise discredited. However, as discussed
in Part I.A.4, it seems implausible that the 1991 Act was meant to foreclose Price Waterhouse burden-shifting for ADEA claims.296 And, as noted
in Part I.B.3, such an argument is even less plausible when applied to a
number of other types of employment discrimination claims.297

§ 1985 claims (18%), and related state law claims (29%)”). Professor Grossman points out
that “[w]here plaintiffs are protected by both Title VII and § 1981, the latter may be used
to hold the individual discriminator liable.” Id. at 378.
293 See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text.
294 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the majority in Gross adduced one implausible rationale
and two other rationales that depend (for their force) on the view that
Price Waterhouse has been discredited. And the Gross Court’s central
support for the proposition that the Price Waterhouse approach has been
discredited was the assertion that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting causes
confusion. Part I.B. examined this assertion in detail.298 Part I.B.1 argued that the Gross Court failed to adduce persuasive support for the
proposition that burden-shifting instructions are inherently confusing
to juries.299 To the extent that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting causes
confusion, it suggested that the relevant confusion arises from two
other sources. As Part I.B.2 noted, much of the confusion arises from
the Court’s failure to provide clear guidance to district courts concerning how to tell when to use a burden-shifting instruction (as opposed to
a burden-retaining instruction).300 Part I.B.3 observed that a different
sort of confusion arises when more than one claim is sent to the jury
and the causation instructions on one claim differ from those on the
other.301
When considered as rationales for repudiating the twenty-year-old
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting practice, these concerns over confusion
are at best a wash. It is true that Gross removed confusion over burdenshifting in the ADEA context, but outlawing burden-shifting was not
the only available option for addressing concerns over trial-court confusion. Meanwhile, the decision in Gross will increase uncertainty, at
least in the short term, concerning the availability of burden-shifting
for various other employment discrimination claims. But despite this
uncertainty, it does seem clear that the holding in Gross will increase
the likelihood that cases will be tried to juries on multiple claims that
carry different burden frameworks. I therefore suggest that—at least
when one takes the arguments offered on the face of the opinion—the
Gross majority failed to carry its burden of showing that Price Waterhouse
should be abandoned.
II. Gross and Policy Considerations
Part I asserted that the reasoning in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc. fails to satisfy.302 The Court’s arguments based on statutory text and
298 See supra notes 75–301 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 79–107 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 108–208 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes 23–301 and accompanying text.
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concerns about judicial administration do not provide persuasive
grounds for abandoning Price Waterhouse burden-shifting. Is it possible
that members of the Court were motivated in part by unstated assumptions concerning the realities of employment discrimination litigation?
Were they responding to concerns that discrimination claims generally
are too easy to assert, or too readily won? Were they proceeding from a
view that age discrimination claims, in particular, warrant more restrictive treatment? No suggestion of such reasoning appears on the face of
the majority opinion (although a stray remark by Justice Alito at oral
argument suggests that some of these considerations might have
crossed the mind of at least one justice).303 Nor, in fact, does Justice
Stevens’s dissent resort to any countervailing assertions concerning the
challenges faced by discrimination plaintiffs.304 Justice Breyer, writing
for three justices, did argue that information asymmetries support the
application of burden-shifting.305 But apart from that suggestion, the
opinions in Gross are strikingly devoid of references to the dynamics of
employment discrimination litigation.
This Part briefly surveys the rich literature concerning those dynamics and their implications for the choice among burden frameworks. To illustrate the (perhaps obvious) point that such choices have
been influenced by justices’ views of the merit and dynamics of litigation concerning the relevant claim, Part II first recounts, in Part II.A.,
evidence from the files of Justice Blackmun concerning the development of the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework.306 Part II.B. surveys
data that might bear upon the calibration of employment discrimination litigation today.307 If, as Justice O’Connor suggested during the
deliberations on Price Waterhouse, the choice of a burden-shifting approach is “neither required by, nor prohibited by” the language of the
relevant statutes, what considerations might one weigh in determining
how best to further the goals of the statutory scheme?308 In this regard,
303 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346–52 (2009); Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 108, at *47 ( Justice Alito: “[I]sn’t age more closely correlated with
legitimate reasons for employment discrimination than race and other factors that are
proscribed by Title VII?”).
304 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
305 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2359 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
306 See infra notes 310–342 and accompanying text.
307 See infra notes 343–399 and accompanying text.
308 Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan, supra note 138. For a
question premised on a similar possibility, see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
108, at *46 ( Justice Kennedy: “Let’s—let’s assume we have authority to incorporate the
Title VII jurisprudence into the ADEA area as a matter of choice. Are there reasons why
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it is also worth noting the circumscribed nature of the question as
framed by both the Price Waterhouse and the Gross Courts: in each instance, the choice is seen as whether or not to shift the burden on liability, and in both instances, the most plaintiff-friendly position is one
that gives the defendant a complete defense to liability. Part II.C.
broadens the focus to acknowledge proposals for a more extensive reorientation of the burden framework.309
A. Mining Mt. Healthy
An examination of mixed-motive burden-shifting in the late 1970s
reveals that the test began its Supreme Court career as a test favored by
justices seeking to curb constitutional claims.
As many commentators have observed, the Price Waterhouse Court
drew the idea of burden-shifting from prior decisions in other contexts,
most prominently from the Court’s 1977 decision in Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle.310 As noted above, Doyle was a
schoolteacher who brought a First Amendment retaliation claim after
the school district failed to renew his teaching contract.311 The first of
the “questions presented” in Mt. Healthy shows why this case involved a
question of mixed motives:
Whether a Board of Education can be forced to give a continuing contract to a non-tenured teacher it considers too
immature for the position, if one of the many factors on
which the Board’s decision is based is a telephone call to a local radio station, such call allegedly being within the First
Amendment rights of the teacher?312

there should be distinctions between the two regimes? . . . Are there reasons of administration or fairness . . . [?]”).
309 See infra notes 400–427 and accompanying text.
310 See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price Waterhouse and the Individual Employment Discrimination Case, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 1023, 1035 (1990) (“The Mt.
Healthy precedent influenced the Price Waterhouse opinions in the Supreme Court and in
the courts below, and the arguments of the parties. Despite all this attention, none of the
Justices examined whether it was appropriate to apply Mt. Healthy at all as a precedent
under Title VII.”). For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s treatment of causation issues in
Title VII class actions, see Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title
VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 292, 302–04 (1982).
311 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276 (1977).
312 Brief for the Petitioner at *4, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (No. 75-1278), 1976 WL
194371.
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Mt. Healthy was a complex case that presented a range of unsettled
issues for the Court’s decision. Before even reaching the merits of the
case, the Court had to resolve a question concerning the amount-incontroversy requirement,313 a claim that the school board was not a
“person” for purposes of § 1983,314 and an assertion of sovereign immunity.315 Thus, the question of burden-shifting was not the only focus
of debate among the justices.316 Nonetheless, the evidence in Justice
Blackmun’s case file is informative; it suggests that some justices’ views
of the burden-shifting question were informed by their assumptions
about Doyle’s claim in particular and the merits of such claims more
generally.
Notes by Justice Blackmun dated prior to the argument in Mt.
Healthy suggest that he sympathized with Doyle’s employer:
It seems to me that Doyle’s general behavior, wholly apart from
the incidental radio station factor, hardly merited renewal of
his contract. Seemingly, he could get along with neither the
authorities, the help, nor the students, and was frequently
driven to apologies for his actions. Giving such emphasis to the
one radio station incident . . . almost manufactures a property
interest in his job.317
The evidence in the case included a statement explaining the school
board’s decision not to renew the contract; the statement not only cited
Doyle’s “lack of tact” but also complained about Doyle’s call to a local
radio station: “You assumed the responsibility to notify W.S.A.I. Radio
313 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 277 (holding that “it was far from a ‘legal certainty’ at
the time of suit that Doyle would not have been entitled to more than $10,000”).
314 See id. at 278–79 (avoiding this contention on the grounds that it was belatedly
raised and non-jurisdictional). As it turned out, the Court would revisit the question of
municipal liability under § 1983 relatively soon. See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
315 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280–81 (“[A] local school board such as petitioner is
more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the State. We therefore hold that it was
not entitled to assert any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal
courts.”).
316 Justice Blackmun’s notes indicate that much of the discussion in conference focused on the question of whether the school board counted as a “person” under § 1983,
with some justices suggesting that the Court dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted
and others objecting, and with some discussion of whether the case should be re-listed for
argument along with Monell v. Department of Social Services. See Conference notes of Justice
Blackmun (Nov. 5, 1976) (on file with author). Citations to internal memoranda and other
internal Court documents concerning Mount Healthy are to items in Box 245 of the Papers
of Justice Harry A. Blackmun.
317 Memorandum signed “H.A.B” at 4 (Sept. 1, 1976) (on file with author).
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Station in regards to the suggestion of the Board of Education that
teachers establish an appropriate dress code for professional people.
This raised much concern not only within this community, but also in
neighboring communities.”318 Justice Blackmun’s notes might be read
to suggest an impulse to commiserate with the defendant over the existence of this evidence: “Of course, had the principal received adequate
legal advice before he responded to the request for reasons, his response would have been very different.”319
Justice Blackmun’s conference notes suggest that the justices
crafted the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting standard with instrumental
goals in mind. For instance, Justice Blackmun’s handwritten notes concerning Chief Justice Burger’s remarks include a notation that could
fairly be interpreted as reading “harmless error approach to avoid endless litigation.”320 In a memo dated a few days after the conference, Justice Rehnquist presumably referred to that discussion when he
stated:“[I]f there were a majority to follow the views advanced by the
Chief, calling it ‘harmless error,’ or by Potter and me, saying that we
would require a ‘but for’ causation in order to sustain a First Amendment claim, I would vacate and remand on the merits.” 321 Justice
Blackmun responded with a memo stating in part: “I could participate
in an approach on ‘but for’ causation. This, in fact, might clear the atmosphere for situations that are cluttered by a secondary First Amendment claim.”322
The justices also engaged in negotiations concerning the wording
of the causal test in Mt. Healthy. Writing in response to a draft circulated
by Justice Rehnquist, Justice Marshall stated that he was “somewhat
troubled by aspects of the penultimate paragraph.”323 Justice Marshall
agreed that Doyle “must prove more than that the school board was
aware of [the call to the radio station], or that they discussed it in making the decision not to renew the contract.”324 He continued, “[I]n my
view, plaintiff must prove that his constitutionally protected activity ac318 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283 n.1.
319 Memorandum signed “H.A.B,” supra note 317, at 4.
320 See Conference notes of Justice Blackmun, supra note 316. A literal transcription of
the handwritten notes would read: “H E approach t avoid endless liti.” Id.
321 Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to the Conference 4 (Nov. 9, 1976) (on file
with author).
322 Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to the Conference (Nov. 10, 1976) (on file
with author).
323 Memorandum from Justice Marshall to Justice Rehnquist (Dec. 13, 1976) (on file
with author).
324 Id.
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tually played a role in (i.e., was one of the reasons for) the decision not
to renew his contract.”325 If Doyle met this burden, Justice Marshall asserted, the school board should then be required to prove that it would
have made the same decision “in any event.”326 Justice Marshall’s concern stemmed from the draft’s wording, which he appeared to view as
placing a greater burden on the plaintiff. As Justice Marshall wrote,
“the terms ‘substantial factor’ and ‘significant role’ are at least ambiguous, and it would be much easier for me to join if you were able to clarify the relevant paragraph along the lines I’ve suggested.”327
Justice Marshall evidently succeeded in convincing Justice Rehnquist to soften the relevant language by adding the phrase “motivating
factor.”328 The next day Justice Rehnquist circulated a second draft,
which stated in relevant part that “the burden was properly placed
upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ —or, to put it in
other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the Board’s decision not
to rehire him.”329 One finds this formulation, in substantially similar
form, in the published opinion.330
Justice Rehnquist also took the opportunity to link the Mt. Healthy
burden-shifting standard to the standard enunciated, in passing, by the
Court in 1977 in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.331 Justice Rehnquist’s memorandum responding to Justice
Marshall recognized that “the draft opinion may not be a model of clarity” concerning the plaintiff’s burden.332 Justice Rehnquist continued:
Lewis’ Arlington Heights opinion has something of the same
problem in it, and I understand he is making some revisions
in its language. When I see what he recirculates, I will try to
sharpen up the paragraph to which you refer in order to accommodate your view and make it consistent with the corresponding part of his draft.333
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Second draft at 12, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (No. 75-1278), circulated Dec. 14,
1976.
329 Id. (citation omitted).
330 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
331 See 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Marshall
(Dec. 13, 1976) (on file with author).
332 Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Marshall, supra note 331.
333 Id.
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In Arlington Heights, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to the village’s denial of rezoning, reasoning
that the plaintiffs “failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village’s decision.”334 At
this point, the Arlington Heights opinion has a footnote that cites Mt.
Healthy and states:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by
a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even
had the impermissible purpose not been considered.335
The footnote was, of course, dictum, because the Court held that the
plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden in this case.336
Why was this dictum included? The footnote did not appear in Justice Powell’s first draft of the Arlington Heights opinion.337 But by the
time Justice Powell circulated a revised first draft, a new “note 21” had
been added.338 Justice Blackmun’s files contain a memorandum (presumably from one of Justice Blackmun’s clerks) expressing doubt about
the change:
I do not think the dictum in note 21, added following page
17, is advisable. Perhaps Justice Powell would be willing to reword the footnote to reserve the question as not presented for
decision in this case. If Mt. Healthy is correct (which I think it
is), its test of causation could well be different because the
first amendment is concerned with effect more than motivation. The distinction is not perfect, but there is enough of a
difference that I would wait for a case in which the issue is

334 429 U.S. at 270.
335 Id. at 270–71, 271 n.21.
336 See id. at 270.
337 See generally First Draft Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (No. 75-616), circulated Dec. 2, 1976. Citations to internal memoranda
and other internal Court documents concerning Arlington Heights are to items in Box 240
of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. In that first draft, there is a text sentence that
is similar (but not identical) to the relevant text sentence in the opinion as published. The
first draft states: “Respondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was a substantial factor in the Village’s decision.” Id. at 17. No footnote is
appended to this sentence. Id.
338 See Memorandum signed RKW (Dec. 13, 1976) (on file with author).
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presented before applying the Mt. Healthy test to racial discrimination under the 14th amendment.339
Notes on this memorandum, in what appears to be Justice Blackmun’s
handwriting, indicate that Justice Blackmun took the matter up with
Justice Powell: “LP says PS - WHR insist—12–13–76 I told him I would
prefer to omit, but would not depart if included I suggested a See cite
to Mt. Healthy & that both cases come down the same day.”340
From this evidence, it seems fair to infer that the reference to the
same-decision defense in footnote 21 of the Arlington Heights opinion
was urged upon Justice Powell by Justices Stewart (“PS”) and Rehnquist
(“WHR”). Despite Justice Blackmun’s request that the footnote be
omitted, it remained in the opinion; but his suggestion that the two
opinions be released on the same day was implemented.
In Mt. Healthy, then, some justices favored the same-decision defense as a way to “avoid endless litigation” or to clear away “secondary”
retaliation claims that were viewed as “clutter.”341 At least some commentators viewed the Court’s endorsement of that defense as a proemployer move.342 In Arlington Heights, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
evidently sought the inclusion of a same-decision defense in footnote
21—perhaps because they saw such a defense as a desirable backstop
against race-discrimination equal protection claims.
B. Calibrating Employment Litigation
The Gross Court’s opinion was remarkable for its failure to discuss
the body of work debating the merits of burden-shifting in employment
discrimination cases. Even an abbreviated review of that literature
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to the Conference, supra note 322; Conference notes of Justice Blackmun, supra note 316.
342 Thus, for instance, Justice Blackmun’s file on Mt. Healthy includes a law professor’s
letter warning that “the holding in Mt. Healthy . . . and note 21 in the Village of Arlington Heights case . . . contain enormous potential for damaging the cause of protecting
Constitutional rights.” Letter from Professor Benjamin M. Schieber to Justice Blackmun
(Mar. 8, 1977) (on file with author). For a more recent assessment of Mt. Healthy, see, e.g.,
Joseph O. Oluwole, On the Road to Garcetti: ‘Unpick’Erring Pickering and Its Progeny, 36
Cap. U. L. Rev. 967, 990 (2008) (“The problem with sanctioning ‘mixed motives’ and the
‘same decision anyway’ affirmative defense is that it empowers employers to concoct posthoc, multiple motives other than the employee’s free speech as justification for a termination, recasting what is actually a ‘single motive’ case as a pretextual ‘mixed motives’ case.
Thus, Mount Healthy effectively strengthened the interests of public employers, relative to
that of employees, in the Pickering [v. Board of Education] calculus.”).
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(which is all that space permits here) reveals the range of policy considerations that might have been—but were not—addressed in the
Gross Court’s opinion. Justice Stevens’s dissent in Gross resembles the
majority’s opinion in one respect: he eschewed any reliance on policy
arguments concerning burden-shifting.343 Instead, he rebutted the majority’s statutory and doctrinal arguments and decried what he termed
the majority’s “unabashed display of judicial lawmaking.” 344 Justices
Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens’s dissent, but they
also wrote separately to adduce policy rationales for retaining Price
Waterhouse burden-shifting in areas not covered by Title VII’s statutory
burden-shifting mechanism.345 Their rationales can provide a starting
point for our discussion.
Justice Breyer pointed out that determining motivation in an employment discrimination case differs from determining causation in a
tort case involving purely physical events:
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “butfor” causation. In that context, reasonably objective scientific
or commonsense theories of physical causation make the concept of “but-for” causation comparatively easy to understand
and relatively easy to apply. But it is an entirely different matter to determine a “but-for” relation when we consider, not
physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that
constitute motive. Sometimes we speak of determining or discovering motives, but more often we ascribe motives, after an
event, to an individual in light of the individual’s thoughts
and other circumstances present at the time of decision.346
Justice Breyer’s reference to “ascribing” motives calls to mind Professor
Mark Brodin’s observation that “issues of causation frequently involve
and indeed mask considerations of policy.”347 Indeed, Justice Breyer

343 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
344 Id. at 2358.
345 See id. at 2358–59.
346 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Blumrosen, supra note 310, at 1042 (“Psychological forces cannot be measured by the same calculus used for physical mechanical forces.”);
Rutherglen, supra note 191, at 61 (“Mixed motive cases concern reasons for action, which,
if they are causes at all, are very special causes. They do not resemble the physical causes
that are familiar from tort law; they are not concerned with physiological mechanisms, but
with mental processes.”).
347 Brodin, supra note 310, at 312.
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went on to suggest two policy considerations in favor of burden-shifting
on a same-decision defense.348
First, Justice Breyer observed that when the issue is whether the
employer would have made the same decision absent the invidious motive, information asymmetry justifies placing the burden of proof on
the employer:
[T]o apply “but-for” causation is to engage in a hypothetical
inquiry about what would have happened if the employer’s
thoughts and other circumstances had been different. The
answer to this hypothetical inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows less than does the
employer about what the employer was thinking at the time,
the employer will often be in a stronger position than the
employee to provide the answer.349
Here, Justice Breyer’s Gross dissent mirrors Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Price Waterhouse, where she too relied on the notion of asymmetric information to support burden-shifting. 350 Interestingly, Justice
O’Connor, like the majority in Gross, relied on her perception of the
challenges of adjudicating employment discrimination claims; but,
where the Gross Court perceived the challenge as arising from difficulties in giving a burden-shifting instruction, Justice O’Connor identified
the challenge as one discrimination plaintiffs face:
[T]here is mounting evidence in the decisions of the lower
courts that [Hopkins] is not alone in her inability to pinpoint
discrimination as the precise cause of her injury, despite having shown that it played a significant role in the decisional
process. Many of these courts, which deal with the evidentiary
issues in Title VII cases on a regular basis, have concluded that
placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant in a situation where uncertainty as to causation has been created by its
consideration of an illegitimate criterion makes sense as a rule
of evidence and furthers the substantive command of Title
VII. Particularly in the context of the professional world,
where decisions are often made by collegial bodies on the ba348 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2359 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
349 Id.; see also Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 Hastings L.J. 643,
655 (2008) (“[V]irtually all of the evidence required to prove ‘but for’ causation is under
the control of the defendant—often in the head of the decision-maker.”).
350 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 273 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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sis of largely subjective criteria, requiring the plaintiff to prove
that any one factor was the definitive cause of the decisionmakers’ action may be tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such decisions.351
Second, Justice Breyer suggests (although less explicitly) that it is
fair to give the employer a same-decision defense so as not to give a
windfall to the plaintiff.352 Once the plaintiff has shown that discrimination was a motivating factor,
the law need not automatically assess liability in these circumstances. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality recognized an affirmative defense where the defendant could show that the
employee would have been dismissed regardless. The law
permits the employer this defense, not because the forbidden
motive, age, had no role in the actual decision, but because
the employer can show that he would have dismissed the employee anyway in the hypothetical circumstance in which his
age-related motive was absent.353
Although Justice Breyer did not spell it out, this passage suggests a reference to the reasoning laid out in Mt. Healthy:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected
conduct played a part, “substantial” or otherwise, in a decision
not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position as
a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct
than he would have occupied had he done nothing. . . . The
constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if
such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he
had not engaged in the conduct.354
Thus, in his dissent, Justice Breyer touched on one of the key rationales for adopting burden-shifting—information asymmetry—and
also adverted to one of the Court’s stated reasons for allowing a samedecision defense—avoiding windfalls to the plaintiff. On the latter
point, a number of commentators have argued that the Price Waterhouse
Court should have distinguished Mt. Healthy rather than importing its

351 Id. (citation omitted).
352 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2359 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
353 Id.
354 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285–86.
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same-decision defense into Price Waterhouse as a defense to liability.355 To
the extent that Mt. Healthy crafted the same-decision defense as a defense to liability (rather than merely a limit on damages),356 the Court
based its holding in part on the concern that marginal employees
might decide to engage in protected speech strategically, in order to
manufacture potential retaliation claims in case they are fired. But a
discrimination plaintiff cannot be suspected of gaming the system in
the same way, because being a member of a protected class is not a matter of choice.357 That critique, however, is better left for discussion in
Part II.C., which considers alternatives to the binary choice between the
position the Court took in Gross and that taken in Price Waterhouse.
As the majority and dissenting opinions in Gross indicate, the question was not whether burden-shifting should occur at the remedy stage
or the liability stage, but instead whether it should occur at all.358 If the
choice is simply between a burden-shifting and a burden-retaining instruction, one might wonder how much is at stake: after all, both approaches ultimately concern but-for causation. And as some justices
suggested during the oral argument in Gross, it is unclear what difference, if any, the choice of a burden-retaining versus a burden-shifting
355 See, e.g., Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 1, 73 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he enactment of Title VII strongly suggests Congressional dissatisfaction with the Court’s treatment
of race and sex discrimination, at least in the employment context[,]” and suggesting that
“Congress must have enacted Title VII to accomplish something more than the Court had
accomplished through traditional equal protection analysis”).
356 This clearly seems to be the case under the Court’s decision in Texas v. Lesage, which
cited Mt. Healthy for the proposition that “where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the
government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury
warranting [retrospective damages] relief under § 1983.” 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999). Some
commentators, however, have criticized this conclusion. See generally Sheldon Nahmod, Mt.
Healthy and Causation-In-Fact: The Court Still Doesn’t Get It!, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 603 (2000)
(arguing that Lesage is in tension with Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)).
357 Admittedly, the gaming-the-system rationale might be argued to apply to one particular subset of employment discrimination claims: A dishonest employee, realizing that
he or she might be fired, might make a discrimination complaint as a way to lay the
groundwork for a retaliation claim. But such a concern seems much less plausible than the
concern about government employees strategically engaging in protected speech, because
in order to have a viable retaliation claim under Title VII based on retaliation for informal
complaints, the complaints “must be based on a ‘reasonable’ and good faith belief that the
practice identified is a violation of Title VII.” George, supra note 183, at 449. (Protection
against retaliation for participating in a formal EEOC charge or ensuing formal processes
is broader.) See id. at 446–48. Moreover, against the possible concern over strategic behavior one should weigh the important systemic goals served by permitting (and facilitating)
retaliation claims. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 59–60 (2005).
358 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348, 2357, 2359.
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instruction makes to the jury.359 Perhaps jurors are relatively impervious to the choice of instruction: the “story model” of juror decision
making suggests that the jurors will decide the case by constructing
narratives that may have little to do with the specifics of the instructions
in the case.360 Moreover, even if jurors are careful to follow instructions
concerning the burden of proof, logic would indicate that the choice
between a burden-shifting and a burden-retaining instruction would
make a difference only when the evidence on but-for causation is in
equipoise. It is, however, also possible that the choice between the two
burden frameworks is more significant than such an analysis would
suggest. For example, the instructions may affect the decision-making
process by framing the jurors’ analysis of the relevant events.361 Moreover, the range of cases affected by burden-shifting would be greater to
the extent that either “the zone of evidential ties is broader and fuzzier
than point probabilities would suggest”362 or jurors perceive the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to require a probability of significantly more than fifty-one percent.363
359 As Justice Souter put it:
[I]sn’t it likely that the jury, regardless of instruction, is going to say something like this: If we find that—that age really was in the boss’s mind when he
fired the person, and the boss comes in, regardless of the instructions, and
says the guy’s work was no good, he got late—he arrived late and so on, the
jury is going to say: Did they really fire him because he was old or because he
didn’t come to work on time? They are going to do the same thing that they
are going to do on the burden-shifting instruction, probably, aren’t they?
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at *25–26; see also id. at *27 ( Justice Souter:
“[I]f you said to the jury, do the right thing, they’d probably come out the same way it
would come out if you gave the burden shifting instruction, I think.”).
360 See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:
The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 521 (1991) (“The Story Model is based on the
hypothesis that jurors impose a narrative story organization on trial information.”); id. at
530 (suggesting that jurors will reach a decision by “matching the accepted story with each
of the verdict definitions” provided in jury instructions).
361 See Richard H. Field et al., Civil Procedure: Materials for a Basic Course
1311 (9th ed. 2007) (“[H]ow the law frames a question—whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the risk of nonpersuasion of a fact—matters. The plaintiff may start from
‘zero,’ or the defendant may. An anchoring heuristic lowers the likelihood of the factfinders determining that the burdened party has prevailed, because people fail to adjust
fully from even an arbitrarily set starting point.”).
362 Id. at 1311–12 (“The factfinder will consider a range of showings indeterminate,
not just perfect ties. Thus, the fact-finder will have to rely on the burden of persuasion
more often than you would imagine.”).
363 See George Rutherglen, supra note 191, at 68 (“Empirical studies have found that
juries interpret proof by a preponderance of the evidence to require more than simply a
bare preponderance of mathematical probabilities.”).
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It would, of course, be helpful to have empirical data on these
questions, but they are difficult to come by. A natural experiment of
sorts may have been provided by the measure adopted in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s model jury instructions,
which advise a judge who cannot decide whether to give a determinative-factor or motivating-factor instruction to send both questions to the
jury in the form of written questions.364 We might attempt to measure
the difference made by burden-shifting instructions by examining the
frequency with which juries respond to this form by finding that: (1)
the plaintiff has not proven that bias was the determinative factor, but
(2) the plaintiff has proven that bias was a motivating factor, and (3)
the defendant has not proven that it would have made the same decision anyway. Such information would add to the meager store of
knowledge on the question, but it would not come close to settling the
issue: even if this form is used frequently enough to yield a large sample
of cases,365 it is questionable whether studying those results would tell
us much about the effects of using either a burden-shifting or a burdenretaining instruction, but not both at once. The use of a special verdict
form, in itself, might alter the dynamics of jury decision making, and so
might the specification of two different proof standards in the same set
of questions.
Another approach might be to compare outcomes in cases where a
burden-shifting instruction is given with cases where a burden-retaining
instruction is given; but there would be obvious difficulties in trying to
ensure that such an approach compared like cases. Still another approach might be to vary the burden instructions given to mock juries,
but no one has yet undertaken such studies with respect to burdenshifting and burden-retaining instructions in discrimination litigation.
Even absent such data, it seems fair to assume that when the
choice between a burden-shifting and a burden-retaining instruction
makes a difference, most of the time that difference works in the plaintiff’s favor. On that assumption, when assessing the two approaches,
one might regard the choice between them as a means of calibrating
the outcomes of discrimination litigation. Admittedly, if one wishes to
calibrate outcomes, the choice of burden-retaining or burden-shifting
jury instructions might seem like a rather weak tool. In discrimination
litigation, as in all litigation, only a tiny fraction of cases actually reach
364 See 8th Cir. Civil Jury Instr. § 5.92 (2008). For a discussion of these instructions,
see supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
365 Although the Eighth Circuit has approved the use of this form, it is unclear how often it has been employed.
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trial. Other measures—affecting gatekeeping by district judges earlier
in the process—may be considerably more powerful.366 On the other
hand, trials, although rare, are more frequent—and jury trials in particular are more common—in employment discrimination litigation
than in most other types of litigation.367 Moreover, settlement outcomes
are likely to reflect expectations concerning trial outcomes. It is also
possible that the choice of burden framework would have effects at the
summary judgment stage. Thus, it would be plausible to regard a
choice between burden frameworks as a means for calibrating the level
and success of discrimination litigation.
If that is the case, then one might wish to know something about
how employment discrimination litigation currently plays out in federal
court. Is there a problem of overclaiming or underclaiming?368 Are discrimination trials too easy (or too hard) to win? On these broader questions, we do possess some relevant data.369 It is certainly the case that
the number of employment discrimination cases in federal court rose
dramatically during the 1990s, and although the numbers of such cases
in federal court have fallen since 1998 they still constitute a significant
portion of the federal civil docket.370 But do these numbers indicate an
366 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517,
522 (2010).
367 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 211, at 123 display 9 (“[T]he fraction of cases
resolved by trial is comparatively higher for employment discrimination cases, as the fraction of cases resolved by trial has fallen from 18.2% in 1979 to 2.8% in 2006 for employment discrimination cases, but from 6.2% in 1979 to the even lower level of 1.0% in 2006
for other cases.”); id. at 126 (“[I]n 1979, only about one in ten trials was a jury trial; by
2006, jury trials were about nine in ten. Compared to other plaintiffs, jobs plaintiffs prefer
jury trial to judge trial.”).
368 In a well-known 1991 article, John Donohue and Peter Siegelman argued that
the vast preponderance of the rise in litigation [from 1970 to 1989] has come
from allegations of discriminatory firing. Such suits actually provide employers with a disincentive—perhaps even a net disincentive—to hire minorities
and women. Thus, we would expect less of an improvement per suit now than
in the earlier phase.
John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 1032–33 (1991). To the extent that such an argument
could ground a proposal for retrenchment in discrimination law, Congress appears to have
taken a different view when, that same year, it codified the statutory burden-shifting
framework for Title VII discrimination claims. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
369 See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 211, at 116, 117, 127.
370 See id. at 116 (reporting that during the 1990s “employment discrimination cases
exploded from 8,303 cases terminated in 1991 to 23,722 cases terminated in 1998”); id. at
117 (noting that “the employment discrimination category has dropped in absolute num-
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onslaught of claims that require deterrence through a more demanding burden of proof? The low overall win rates in employment discrimination litigation suggest not.371 Moreover, developments in pleading requirements, summary judgment standards, and expert testimony
doctrine over the past thirty years have augmented the district judge’s
authority to reject claims of civil rights violations and employment discrimination.372
Because most cases settle, it is important to take account of settlement outcomes. Analyzing “an anonymously coded dataset of 1,170
cases settled by federal magistrate judges in Chicago over a six-year period ending in 2005,” Minna Kotkin has concluded that “there are very
few settlements which are so low that it could be presumed that the
case is frivolous,” and that “most settlements show a reasonable degree
of plaintiff success.”373 Specifically, leaving aside class actions and cases

ber of terminations every year after 1998,” that in 2001 “employment discrimination cases
constituted nearly ten percent of federal civil terminations” and that in 2006 such cases
“accounted for fewer than six percent of federal civil terminations”).
371 Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab report that “[t]he most significant observation
about the district courts’ adjudication of employment discrimination cases is the long-run
lack of success for these plaintiffs relative to other plaintiffs. Over the period of 1979–2006
in federal court, the plaintiff win rate for jobs cases (15%) was much lower than that for
non-jobs cases (51%).” Id. at 127.
372 See Schneider, supra note 366, at 527–55 (documenting these developments); see
also Clermont & Schwab, supra note 211, at 128 (arguing that “the difference in win rates
between jobs cases and non-jobs cases shows that pretrial adjudication particularly disfavors employment discrimination plaintiffs”); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
A Windfall for Defendants, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99, 101, 102 (1999) (arguing, based
on a “review of every appellate decision and many of the district court cases decided since
the ADA became effective in 1992,” that summary judgment is granted with undue frequency in ADA cases because “district courts are refusing to send ‘normative’ factual questions to the jury, such as issues of whether an individual has a ‘disability’” and because
courts are “creating an impossibly high threshold of proof for defeating a summary judgment motion”).
Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman have reviewed “the various doctrines that obligate employees to promptly challenge and report violations of Title VII rights.” Deborah L.
Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L.
Rev. 859, 864 (2008). They argue that doctrines such as “the statute of limitations, the
definition of the acts that trigger the limitations period, equitable tolling and discovery
rules, the special rules for reporting and challenging sexual harassment, and the role of
internal employer procedures in the timing requirements for formally asserting Title VII
rights” tend to “close off substantive protections from employees who do not match the
law’s ideal.” Id. at 864–65.
373 Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 111, 111, 117 (2007).
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involving multiple plaintiffs, Kotkin found that the mean settlement
was approximately $54,000 and the median settlement was $30,000.374
Interestingly, win rates at trial show less of an overall difference
between employment discrimination cases and other types of cases in
recent years than in the 1980s.375 The reason for the convergence appears to be that in recent years more employment discrimination cases
are tried to juries than to judges and that the set of such cases tried to
juries has a higher plaintiff win rate than the set of such cases tried to
judges.376 Even so, the plaintiff win rate in employment discrimination
jury trials has remained generally below the plaintiff win rate in other
types of jury trials and has almost always remained below fifty percent.377 Although the win rate at trial is obviously affected by the mix of
cases that reach trial, it seems fair to say that neither judges nor juries
appear to be reflexively ruling in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases.
At a more fine-grained level, one might consider the challenges
those seeking to prove employment discrimination face. A number of
commentators have observed that as discrimination becomes less and
less overt, the difficulty of proving a discrimination claim increases.378
As Linda Krieger has argued, “[t]he conscious, deliberate desire to exclude women and minorities from the workforce has largely disappeared, but forms of intergroup bias stemming from social categorization and the cognitive distortions which inexorably flow from it re-

374 See id. at 139, 144. Noting the low plaintiff win rates at trial in discrimination cases,
Kotkin posits “that the departure from the expected 50% trial success rate is explained by
employers’ interest in not being labeled a discriminator, not by weak plaintiff claims.” Id. at
117.
375 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 211, at 129 display 15.
376 See id. at 129–30.
377 See id. at 130 display 16. Michael Delikat and Morris Kleiner studied employment
discrimination cases that were decided in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York from April 1, 1997 to July 31, 2001. They report that “of the 3,000 discrimination cases filed during a four-and-one-quarter-year period, only 125 cases (3.8% of the
total) were tried to conclusion, 115 by juries, 10 by judges.” Michael Delikat & Morris M.
Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate
Their Rights?, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 56, 56 (2003). They state that “employment discrimination
plaintiffs prevailed in about one-third of the trials (33.6%) while the employers prevailed
in the rest.” Id. at 57.
378 See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 368, at 1032 (“[T]he flagrant and obvious violations of the pre-Title VII era—systematic refusal to hire women or minorities for
certain jobs, gross disparities in pay for identical jobs, segregated work place facilities–were
much more likely to produce plaintiff victories than the subtler and less-frequent forms of
discrimination practiced today.”).
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main.”379 Krieger points out that when these cognitive forms of intergroup bias contribute to an employment decision, there may well be
evidence of another, seemingly legitimate, reason for the decision, and
there may not be direct evidence of the invidious reason.380 Others
have pointed out that even the seemingly neutral reason for the employment action might, upon closer examination, turn out to be the
product of perceptions, recollections, and assessments that themselves
are affected by bias.381 Marshalling proof of these subtler forms of bias
is challenging.
More broadly, one can see that victims of discrimination face disincentives to bring a claim and that those who do bring claims must
surmount significant structural obstacles. 382 Deborah Brake reports
studies showing “general reluctance on the part of women and persons
of color to perceive themselves as targets of discrimination, notwithstanding evidence that discrimination has occurred.”383 Brake also reports studies suggesting that women or people of color who challenge
discrimination may face social stigma for doing so.384 Retaliation for
discrimination claims appears to be common.385 Although Title VII and
other statutes prohibit retaliation against those who bring forward discrimination claims, doctrinal limits circumscribe the availability of such
retaliation claims.386
379 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1241 (1995). Judith
Olans Brown, Stephen Subrin, and Phyllis Tropper Baumann have argued that the same
sorts of biases can affect jury decision making. See Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts
About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the
Judicial Dialogue, 46 Emory L.J. 1487, 1508 (1997) (proposing that “the trial judge caution
jurors about unconscious cognitive stereotyping by pointing out the human tendency to
see life and evaluate evidence through a clouded filter that favors those like themselves”).
380 Krieger, supra note 379, at 1223–24.
381 See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of
Power, 41 Hastings L.J. 471, 527 (1990) (arguing that when the assertedly legitimate reason for the action is based on a subjective judgment, that reason may itself be the product
of stereotypes). But see Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical View of Mixed
Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1029, 1063 (criticizing
Radford for “carv[ing] out for protection so-called objective standards that were designed
with working men, not women, in mind”).
382 See Brake, supra note 357.
383 Id. at 26.
384 See id. at 32–36.
385 See id. at 38 n.59.
386 On the other hand, Glenn George posits that plaintiffs may have better chances of
winning on a retaliation claim than on the underlying discrimination claim:
[I]n a typical discrimination trial, where the jury is often presented with evidence of both discrimination and employee performance problems allegedly
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In short, the data on employment discrimination litigation generally do not appear to demonstrate that Price Waterhouse should be rejected in order to deter claims or to make it more difficult for plaintiffs
to prevail. What of ADEA claims in particular? George Rutherglen, analyzing data from an American Bar Foundation survey of some 1250
employment discrimination cases in seven cities from 1972 to 1987,
found that ADEA cases were settled at a higher rate (57.9%) than nonADEA cases (46.5%), that the defendant won at various stages in 26.3%
of ADEA cases compared with 47% of non-ADEA cases, and that plaintiffs won at trial in 6.3% of ADEA cases compared with 2.2% of nonADEA cases.387 Rutherglen concluded that “claims under the ADEA are
brought predominantly by white males who hold relatively high-status
and high-paying jobs” and that such claims “mainly allege discriminatory discharge and result in recovery of money judgments several times
higher than other claims of employment discrimination.”388 Arguing
that “claims under the ADEA more closely resemble claims for wrongful discharge than other claims of employment discrimination,”
Rutherglen asserted that “the ADEA cannot be justified, either doctrinally or empirically, because it protects a disfavored and relatively powerless minority group from discrimination.”389 Michael Selmi has suggested that
treating all discrimination cases equally can lead to a doctrinal
mismatch; age cases have largely borrowed the proof structure
from Title VII, even though the prima facie case in an age discrimination case is likely to offer less probative value than is
justifying the employer’s adverse action, a juror may be slower to find a discriminatory motive because he or she would be reluctant to evaluate their
own actions through that lens. When presented with evidence of a retaliatory
motive, however, a juror may more readily identify with the employer’s alleged resentment if the employer feels he was wrongly accused of discriminating against the plaintiff. Because the juror can more easily project his or her
own revenge or retaliation instinct in a similar situation, he or she may more
easily conclude that retaliation played a role in the adverse decision made.
George, supra note 183, at 469.
However, Wendy Parker’s analysis of 467 opinions in employment discrimination cases
did not find that plaintiffs claiming retaliation had higher success rates. See Wendy Parker,
Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 889, 918
(2006). Though this study was limited to opinions available on Westlaw, and thus may not
reflect the mix of results in all cases, the finding is nonetheless suggestive.
387 See George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law, 24 J. Legal Stud. 491, 504–05, 504 n.67, 512 tbl. 6 (1995).
388 Id. at 491.
389 Id.
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true in a race discrimination case because of the different histories our country has experienced with respect to race and
age discrimination.390
It is possible that some such concern factored into the justices’ deliberations. At oral argument, for example, Justice Alito asked: “[I]sn’t age
more closely correlated with legitimate reasons for employment discrimination than race and other factors that are proscribed by Title
VII?”391
Perhaps, then, intuitions that ADEA cases are distinctive animated
some justices’ views of the issue in Gross. That possibility might support
an argument that Gross should not apply to other types of discrimination claims. It is worth noting, however, that other studies suggest a different view of age claims. David Oppenheimer, reporting on a study
that “examined every California employment law jury verdict reported
in one or more of the state’s three major jury verdict reporters for the
years 1998 and 1999,” found that “women alleging age discrimination
lost every case they tried, while men alleging age discrimination won
36% of the time.”392 Oppenheimer’s study may have included age discrimination claims under California state law as well as under the
ADEA, and the jury verdict reporter data are not comprehensive.393
Nonetheless, these figures suggest that in age discrimination cases, as in
employment discrimination claims more generally, juries are not reflexively finding in favor of plaintiffs. Wendy Parker examined cases filed in
2002 in the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and the Northern District of Texas, including 192 cases involving race
or national origin discrimination claims, 172 cases involving gender
discrimination claims, and 109 cases involving age discrimination
claims.394 Defendants won pretrial judgments in 17% of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania age discrimination cases and 22% of the
Northern District of Texas age discrimination cases.395 By comparison,
390 Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 La. L.
Rev. 555, 565 (2001).
391 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at *47.
392 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women
and Minorities, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 511, 515–16, 549 (2003).
393 See id. at 550–51 (arguing that reporting bias may skew jury verdict reporter data
because plaintiff wins may be more likely to be reported than defendant wins).
394 Parker, supra note 386, at 904–05, 949 tbl. A3, 951 tbl. A4. It appears that national
origin claims were coded as race claims, so Professor Parker treats the two together as
“race discrimination” claims. See id. at 904 & n.70.
395 Id. at 954 tbl. A6.
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defendants won pretrial judgments in 6% of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania gender discrimination cases, 14% of the Northern District
of Texas gender discrimination cases, 7% of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania race discrimination cases, and 26% of the Northern District of Texas race discrimination cases.396 Age discrimination cases settled at a rate of 78% in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and 53% in
the Northern District of Texas.397 Settlement rates were 78% for Eastern District of Pennsylvania race claims, 58% for Northern District of
Texas race claims, 87% for Eastern District of Pennsylvania gender
claims, and 72% for Northern District of Texas gender claims.398 From
these data, Parker concludes that “[a]ge discrimination cases appear to
be much harder to win (and settle) than previously proposed.”399
C. Reorienting Employment Litigation
Part II.B. argued that the data on discrimination litigation do not
appear to justify the ruling in Gross as a means of recalibrating levels of
claiming or litigation outcomes.400 In making that argument, Part II.B.
focused on the choice discussed by the majority and the dissents in
Gross—namely, the choice between a burden-retaining and a burdenshifting approach to liability. It is important to note the constrained nature of that analysis. This Part steps further back to note the possibility
of a more significant overhaul of the current system.401 Part II.B was essentially conservative in its focus; it argued that the data on employment
discrimination litigation do not appear to indicate a reason to switch
from the Price Waterhouse framework to a unitary burden-retaining
framework. This Part notes that arguments could, instead, be made for

396 Id. at 949 tbl. A3, 951 tbl. A4, 953 tbl. A5.
397 Id. at 954 tbl. A6.
398 Id. at 949 tbl. A3, 951 tbl. A4, 953 tbl. A5.
399 Id. at 930. Parker indicates that two Eastern District of Pennsylvania age cases were
disposed of by jury verdicts for plaintiffs; she does not list any Eastern District of Pennsylvania age discrimination jury verdicts for defendants, and apparently the sample included
no Eastern District of Pennsylvania bench trials on age discrimination claims. See id. at 954
tbl. A6. Parker indicates that one Northern District of Texas age case was disposed of by a
ruling for the defendant after a bench trial; she does not list any Northern District of
Texas age discrimination rulings for the plaintiff after a bench trial, and apparently the
sample included no Northern District of Texas jury trials on age discrimination claims. See
id.
400 See supra notes 343–399 and accompanying text; see also Katz, supra note 16, at 890
(arguing that Gross “provides a windfall to defendants, fails to punish discriminators, under-deters discrimination, and places an undue burden of proof on plaintiffs”).
401 See infra notes 400–427 and accompanying text.
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moving in the opposite direction—in other words, for extending the
statutory burden-shifting mechanism to claims beyond Title VII.402
Price Waterhouse, after all, has long been criticized by some as too
favorable to defendants.403 As Reginald Govan recalls, “[c]ivil rights
advocates initially hailed [Price Waterhouse] . . . as a great victory,” but
opinion later shifted:
Civil rights advocates immediately embraced these new burden-shifting rules. Only later did they focus on that part of the
Court’s holding that completely absolved employers of liability upon proof that their decision was predicated on permissible as well as impermissible factors. Thereafter, civil rights advocates contended that Price Waterhouse let employers escape

402 When considering legislation to make burden frameworks consistent, Congress
might also study possibilities for adjusting the choices made in Title VII’s statutory burdenshifting framework. William Corbett has observed that the statutory framework’s “limitation on remedies is substantial, leaving the plaintiff without any money (except possibly
attorneys’ fees) if the defendant prevails on same decision.” William R. Corbett, Fixing
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. Rev. 81, 107 (2009). And as others have observed, “courts usually have refused to award attorney fees to the employee when the employer proves that it would have made the same employment decision absent the discriminatory motive and when injunctive relief is not necessary.” Thomas H. Barnard & George
S. Crisci, “Mixed-Motive” Discrimination Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Still a “Pyrrhic Victory” for Plaintiffs?, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 673, 674 (2000). Corbett suggests that “Congress
could reduce the remedy limitation, making it possible for a plaintiff to recover a monetary remedy,” through either of two possible means: “1) the same-decision defense cuts off
compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief of reinstatement (instatement,
promotion, etc.) and front pay, but not backpay; or 2) the same-decision defense cuts off
punitive damages and injunctive relief such as reinstatement, but not backpay and compensatory damages.” Corbett, supra, at 108. Corbett advocates the second option “because
the remedy for disparate treatment should provide relief for lost wages and compensation
for emotional distress injuries that makes the plaintiff whole.” Id. Martin Katz has also
proposed adjustments in the statutory remedial framework. He argues that “the procedural-and-substantive two-tier approach used in current doctrine should be modified to
include meaningful punitive and deterrent sanctions at the ‘motivating factor’ level of
causation[,]” and that “the two-tier approach used in current doctrine should be modified
to include meaningful incentives for plaintiffs and their attorneys to act as private attorneys general in over-determined/‘same action’ cases.” Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental
Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 Geo. L.J. 489,
539–40 (2006). Linda Krieger has suggested that “cognitive bias-based disparate treatment”
should be explicitly recognized as actionable, but should not result in compensatory or
punitive damages. Krieger, supra note 379, at 1243–44. An assessment of the merits of these
proposals lies beyond the scope of this Article.
403 See, e.g., Govan, supra note 44, at 17–18; Hart, supra note 176, at 759.
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liability for “overt sexism or racism . . . as long as it was not
the only thing on the employer’s mind.”404
The notion of “mixed motives” is useful because it evokes a more
realistic understanding of how discrimination occurs.405 But critics of
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting take issue with the notion that the
mixed-motive framework should include the same-decision defense as a
defense to liability.406 Many such commentators argue that once a discrimination plaintiff shows that the invidious motive was a motivating
factor in the challenged decision, liability should be taken as established and the same-decision defense should only affect the question of
remedies.407 In this view, the presence of a discriminatory motive triggers the deterrent function of employment discrimination law.408 The
wish to avoid a windfall to the plaintiff is relevant only to the law’s compensatory goal and not the public interest in deterring discrimination.409 Even if the employer’s discriminatory motivation did not make
a difference to the outcome in that particular instance, it affects the
workplace in ways that may increase the likelihood of future discriminatory acts. Furthermore, an employee subjected to an employment decision in part based upon discriminatory reasons suffers a dignitary harm
even if the employment action would have been taken anyway.410
404 Govan, supra note 44, at 17–18 (citation omitted); see also Hart, supra note 176, at
759 (“The mixed motive claim [as defined in Price Waterhouse] was, at best, a mixed blessing for plaintiffs. On the one hand, it went a step toward eliminating the notion that an
employee has been discriminated against only if race or gender was the exclusive motivator for the decision. On the other hand, an employer could use discriminatory factors in
the decision-making process but still avoid any liability if it could show that it would have
made the same decision anyway.”).
405 See Hart, supra note 176, at 760 (“[M]ost of the significant psychological models for
racism today suggest that discrimination most often occurs when the decisionmaker can
justify the decision in some other way.”); Krieger, supra note 379, at 1223 (“Mixed-motives
theory reflects much more accurately than pretext theory the processes by which cognitive
sources of bias result in intergroup discrimination.”).
406 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 317; Katz, supra note 349, at 658.
407 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 317; Katz, supra note 349, at 658.
408 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 317; Katz, supra note 349, at 658.
409 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 319–20 (arguing that “Congress has relied primarily
on private litigants for the judicial enforcement of title VII, thus imbuing these private
actions with a social function unaddressed by the Mt. Healthy theory of causality”) (citation
omitted). Martin Katz has argued that when a defendant was motivated by bias but there
was also a non-discriminatory and sufficient reason for the employment action, the problem of windfalls can best be dealt with “by splitting this windfall between the two parties”
according to a sort of “comparative fault rule.” Katz, supra note 402, at 545.
410 See Blumrosen, supra note 310, at 1040 (“Discrimination has both economic and
dignitary aspects. The ‘same decision’ rule confines title VII to protection of economic
interests and in effect casts out many employees from its protection.”); Brodin, supra note
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The 1991 Act responded to such concerns, in the field of Title VII
claims, by crafting the statutory burden-shifting mechanism so that the
same-decision defense goes only to remedies and not to liability.411 A
number of commentators argue that the statutory burden-shifting mechanism, for this reason, better implements anti-discrimination principles.412 Such commentators advocate the extension of that approach to
other employment discrimination claims.413 Such an extension would
carry the significant advantage of rendering the approach to burden
frameworks consistent across different types of claims. Consistency
would be particularly valuable because, as Part I.B.4 illustrated, a significant number of trials involve more than one type of claim.414

310, at 318–19 (“Since the stigmatization that discrimination based on an immutable characteristic inflicts on a person occurs when that characteristic operates as a motivating factor, should not title VII provide the victim with some relief at that point?”) (citation omitted).
411 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a), (b), §§ 703(m), 706(g).
412 Mark Brodin, writing almost a decade before the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, suggested a somewhat similar mechanism. See Brodin, supra note 310, at 323 (proposing a system under which “[a] plaintiff who establishes that a prohibited criterion was a
motivating factor in the challenged decision thereby establishes a violation of the Act and
thus the defendant’s liability. The same-decision test would then be applied only to determine the appropriate remedy.”) (citation omitted). Melissa Hart has argued that Title VII’s
two-tiered remedial structure “may further aid efforts to challenge unconscious discrimination by creating a middle ground that will make courts comfortable with acknowledging
the role that discrimination can play even in cases where employers can otherwise justify
their decisions.” Hart, supra note 176, at 762.
413 See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 402, at 109 (suggesting modifications to the statutory
burden-shifting framework and arguing that “Congress should . . . expressly provid[e]
that the one new proof structure applies to disparate treatment claims under Title VII,
Section 1981, the ADEA, and the ADA”); Katz, supra note 349, at 659; Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas’s
Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 511, 560–62 (2008) (arguing that
Congress should “add the 703(m) language to the other statutes and the corresponding
anti-retaliation provisions,” “clarify[] the availability and character of the same-decision
defense,” and “incorporate the Desert Palace ruling into the other statutes”); Michael J.
Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30
Ga. L. Rev. 563, 625–26 & n.202 (1996).
Even absent legislation explicitly extending the statutory burden-shifting framework to
§ 1981, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the same-decision defense goes only to
remedies, not to liability, on § 1981 discrimination claims (though it also concluded that
the same-decision defense goes to liability on § 1981 retaliation claims). See Metoyer v.
Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 934 (9th Cir. 2007). By contrast, in an unpublished decision a
Sixth Circuit panel—without citing Price Waterhouse—held a mixed-motive framework inapplicable to a § 1981 case on the ground that § 2000e-2(m) does not apply to such
claims. See Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 F. App’x 667, 676, 2005 WL 3078627, *7 (6th
Cir. 2005).
414 See supra notes 277–301 and accompanying text.
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Since the time this Article was first drafted, bills that would extend
the statutory burden-shifting mechanism well beyond Title VII have
been introduced in both houses of Congress. I will summarize here the
current version of the Senate Bill; the House Bill is substantially similar.415 The bill’s findings state that “unlawful discrimination is often difficult to detect and prove because discriminators do not usually admit
their discrimination and often try to conceal their true motives.”416 Rejecting the reasoning of Gross—which, as we have seen, asserted that the
1991 amendments foreclosed burden-shifting in ADEA cases—the bill
states that “Congress has relied on” the premise that the ADEA “and
similar antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws . . . would be interpreted consistently with judicial interpretations of title VII . . . including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”417 Absent legislation, the findings conclude, “victims of age discrimination will find it
unduly difficult to prove their claims and victims of other types of discrimination may find their rights and remedies uncertain and unpredictable.”418
The bill is designed
to ensure that the standard for proving unlawful disparate
treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 and other anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws
is no different than the standard for making such a proof under title VII . . . including amendments made by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.419
To accomplish this goal of uniform treatment, the bill creates a proof
framework modeled on the existing statutory framework for Title VII
discrimination claims.420 The proof framework will apply not just to all
ADEA claims but also to claims under any other federal law forbidding
employment discrimination, to claims under “any provision of the Constitution that protects against discrimination or retaliation,” and—with
certain exceptions—to claims under any law “forbidding . . . retaliation against an individual for engaging in, or interference with, any
federally protected activity including the exercise of any right estab415 See generally S. 1756, 111th Cong., 1st. Sess. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong., 1st.
Sess. (2009).
416 S. 1756, § 2(a)(2).
417 Id. § 2(a)(3).
418 Id. § 2(a)(6).
419 Id. § 2(b).
420 Id. § 3.
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lished by Federal law (including a whistleblower law).”421 The bill excludes from the new framework anti-retaliation claims under laws that
have “an express provision regarding a legal burden of proof.”422
From this summary, one can see that the bill would do more than
merely erase the effects of Gross itself. It would extend the statutory
burden-shifting mechanism to claims—such as ADEA claims—that
prior to Gross would likely have been governed instead by the Price Waterhouse (or Mount Healthy) burden-shifting mechanism. 423 The bill’s
statutory burden-shifting mechanism would also extend to some types
of claims that might not have previously been subject to either Price
Waterhouse or statutory burden-shifting. 424 The proposed statutory
mechanism would enable a plaintiff to establish liability by proving that
discrimination (or retaliation) was a motivating factor in the challenged action, although the defendant could limit remedies by proving
that it would have made the same decision anyway.425 The bill would
also clear up certain questions that have plagued burden-shifting doctrine. For one thing, the bill would indicate that the plaintiff can
choose whether to proceed under a motivating-factor or determinativefactor burden framework.426 For another, the bill would also provide—
as Desert Palace v. Costa did for Title VII discrimination claims—that the
plaintiff can use either circumstantial or direct evidence to establish a
claim under either the motivating-factor or determinative-factor framework.427
Conclusion
Although the scholarly literature abounds with criticisms of Price
Waterhouse burden-shifting, the most common complaints have been
that the decision did not go far enough (and should have provided for
liability upon a finding of illicit motivation) and that the decision failed
to provide guidance on when a burden-shifting (as opposed to a burden-retaining) instruction should be used. In Gross v. FBL Financial Ser421 Id. § 3 (adding new subsection (g)(5) to 29 U.S.C. § 623).
422 S. 1756 § 3, 111th Cong., 1st. Sess. (2009) (adding new subsection (g)(6) to 29
U.S.C. § 623). This carve-out would exclude, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 1221’s whistleblower
provision, which sets a clear-and-convincing burden for the employer proving a samedecision defense. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2) (2006).
423 See S. 1756 § 3.
424 Examples would be EPA retaliation claims and FLSA retaliation claims.
425 See S. 1756, § 3 (adding new subsection (g) to 29 U.S.C. § 623).
426 See id.
427 See id.
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vices, Inc., the majority chose instead to move the law in the other direction and prohibit the use of burden-shifting for all ADEA discrimination claims.
Because lower courts had long been applying Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to such claims, the holding in Gross constituted a departure
from well-established law. The Gross majority chose to reject Price Waterhouse on the basis that sound judicial administration required it to do
so—because, the Court said, Price Waterhouse burden-shifting causes too
much confusion. But, as Part I.B.2 argued, the strongest argument concerning confusion is simply that lower courts lack guidance as to when
a burden-shifting instruction is appropriate and when it is not. Gross
has, admittedly, eliminated that confusion for purposes of ADEA discrimination claims. But holding burden-shifting categorically inapplicable to such claims was not the only possible option for addressing
such confusion. The Court could instead have extended Desert Palace v.
Costa to non-statutory burden-shifting, holding that such burdenshifting is available (under Price Waterhouse) whenever either direct or
circumstantial evidence exists that discrimination was a motivating factor. The purely technical goal of eliminating doctrinal confusion does
not suffice to determine the choice between these two options, since
either option would accomplish that goal. If the majority’s choice between the options flowed instead from underlying views about the goals
of the ADEA or the realities of age discrimination litigation, the majority opinion might have been more persuasive—or, at the least, less puzzling—if it had said so.428
While the Gross Court put an end to debates over burden-shifting
in the ADEA context, the decision will spark litigation over the viability
of burden-shifting for a range of other types of claims. As Part I.B.3
notes, the availability of burden-shifting under Gross may vary from
claim to claim because not all the rationales adduced by the Gross Court
apply to each type of claim. In addition to those rationales, other policy
concerns might legitimately be considered. For example, the fact that
all of the Gross Court’s rationales apply to Title VII retaliation claims
need not compel the conclusion that burden-shifting is unavailable for
all such claims. A court faced with this question might consider, for example, the vital role played by anti-retaliation provisions in ensuring
the effective enforcement of the law. The court might also consider the
428 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 312–13 (“[F]ew of the published opinions dealing
with the causation question in title VII litigation make an explicit reference to policy concerns or address the fundamental question, ‘How can the policies of [this] public law best
be served in a concrete case?’”).
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fact that Title VII retaliation claims will often go to the jury accompanied by a Title VII discrimination claim that entails a statutory burdenshifting instruction. In short, this Article argued that—even as to claims
to which all of the Gross rationales appear to pertain—the applicability
of Gross should not be viewed as clear-cut.
Ultimately, however, it appears likely that the Court will extend
Gross to some or all of the claims discussed in Part I.B.3. And, if it takes
an approach similar to Gross, the Court will do so without an assessment
of the data discussed in Part II.B. Explicit discussions of those considerations are more likely to occur in legislative deliberations than in Supreme Court caselaw. As Part II.C notes, bills have been introduced in
both houses of Congress that would extend statutory burden-shifting to
all federal employment discrimination claims, to many federal antiretaliation claims, and to all federal constitutional discrimination or
retaliation claims. If such legislation comes to pass, then the Supreme
Court in Gross might ultimately achieve what commentators have not—
namely, spurring the adoption of legislation that codifies burdenshifting across a range of different types of claims.

